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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The involvement of Brigham Young University (hereinafter referred to
as "BYU") (Provo, Utah, USA) during the period 1960 through 1963 with a boys'
orphanage and dairy farm operated by the Arab Development Society in Jericho
(Israeli occupied West Bank) is an example of private bilateral foreign aid. BYU's
role was to help build the dairy project to increase the opportunities for the young
boys at the ADS boys' town and help to prepare them for a better life. This was to
be done by the example of the personnel sent to the project from BYU and also by
the instruction of dairy management and milk processing skills. Moreover, the
project would supply fresh dairy products to improve the diet of the young orphan
boys. The dairy farm was intended to be a model dairy farm for all of the Middle
East.
The purpose, of this study is to examine nine essential planning
principles in the selecting and implementing an aid project. These nine principles
will then be used to analyze BYU's involvement with the ADS dairy project. The
project is presented from a historical viewpoint.

An analysis is mainly given

retrospectively at the end of the history of the BYU involvement phase of the
project.
The nine points by which the case study will be analyzed are essential
in the planning of any project. All private bilateral aid projects need to adhere to
the following points. These points have been delineated by Addison Maunder.
1
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First, the project must be based on careful analysis of factual
situations. The project needs to be studied properly to obtain all the real facts
pertaining to the objectives of the project.
Second, the project needs to be selected for actions which concern
recognized needs. The most important needs of the receivers must be ascertained
and the objectives defined clearly to meet those needs.
Third, the project needs to be oriented to the existing technical,
economic and social level of the receiving institution in order to make the project
achievable. The project initiators must evaluate the ability levels and resources
of the receivers in order to develop objectives that can be attained, some shortterm and some long-term.
Fourth, the objectives need to be defined clearly at all levels in terms
that people will understand and without any obvious hidden agendas.
Fifth, open communication and democratic methods are essential in
developing the project. Clear channels and methods of communication are needed
and the democratic, or the meeting of the minds, method of decision-making
needs to be followed.
Sixth, the project needs to be flexible to meet the long-term situations
and short-term changes and special emergencies.
flexibility

The project needs built-in

to ensure that some changes do not drastically interrupt

the

implementation of the project.
Seventh, the project needs to be educational and directed toward
bringing about improvement in the ability of the people to solve their own
problems. The project ought to direct its educational objectives to helping the
receivers learn how to solve their own problems in order for them to become more
self-sufficient.
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Eighth, the project should be carried out by well-trained personnel who
are effectively supervised.

The donor personnel need to have the necessary

practical ability to implement the project and the supervisors need this same
ability in order to help solve any problems which may arise.
Ninth, the project must be well planned with the proper provision for
evaluating the results.

The project needs to have well-defined objectives and

well-defined methods of data collection and reporting in order to obtain a valid
and credible evaluation of the project.
The methodological approach for this thesis is a case study.

The

project was researched from its conception to BYU's termination in the project.
In addition, it covers a time period of several years beyond BYU's active
participation. The sources of information came from the Wilkinson Presidential
Papers in the BYU Library Archives, letters and writings of Bert Bigler, which are
in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints Historical Archives, personal
interviews with relevant individuals, and the Jerusalem Post newspaper office in
Israel.
The results of the study yielded the following major observations. BYU
was not directly involved in the planning but should have taken a more active part
in planning and evaluating the project once it became officially involved in
funding part of the operation. This deficiency definitely created many problems
such as allowing the ADS manager to control the entire million dollar project
without having a knowledge of dairy project planning and management, allowing
the

manager

to continue

his poor management

practices, allowing poor

communication practices and hidden agendas, and allowing cultural conflicts to
occur because a proper orientation was not provided to the donor personnel who
were sent to the on-site project.

Moreover, there were personality conflicts
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which

could

have been minimized had there

been better

planning and

understanding of the key figures involved before BYU became involved.

The

result was a modern dairy operation which never has been fully and consistantly
operated. The short-term of one to two years involvement after all the equipment
was put into operation resulted in inadequate training and supervision of personnel
to manage and operate the dairy and milk processing equipment on a continual
basis once the donor personnel left the project.

The dairy was not effectively

operated because of the poor management of the receivers and the insufficient
use of criteria such as the nine principles of planning, monitoring, and evaluating
the project.
While this particular case study does not represent a totally successful
example of private bilateral foreign aid, it can be used as a learning exercise for
improving organization, administration and communication in the development of
other private bilateral foreign aid projects.
The story of this project is also an interesting aspect of the Wilkinson
era in the history of Brigham Young University.

CHAPTER 2
PRIVATE BILATERAL FOREIGN AID
DEFINITION AND CRITERION
Private bilateral foreign aid is the transfer of material and/or
nonmaterial resources from a donor in one country to a receiver in another
country through legal channels external to the government of the two countries
involved with minimal considerations for the foreign policies of the countries
involved and maximum considerations of the humanitarian results of the person
to person process.
The basic goals of providing bilateral aid is to improve the life style
of the recipients through the introduction of new technology with the proper
supervision and training in order that the recipients may learn how to be selfsufficient.
Careful planning is essential to the success of any project. The intent
of good planning is to insure the proper selection of a project, implement it in
the most efficient manner, and reach the goals set forth. While the literature
concerning planning is immense, the focus of concern for this thesis is that for
any bilateral project to be successful certain planning principles must be
followed. Those planning principles have been delineated by Maunder.
Addison H. Maunder is world renowned for his work in extension
program planning. He has worked in extension planning in the United States and
Europe for at least thirty years.

The Food and Agricultural Organization

selected Maunder to assemble an extension manual. The principles which he
5
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selected are a synthesis of numerous articles including his own in planning
extension, community development and general social change. The principles are
seen as a whole as fundamental points for a project in planned change.
Maunder discusses thirteen planning principles in the extension
reference manual. Three of these principles (Maunder's 3, 10, and 12) refer to
the rural family and community involvement in the project.

These principles

were omitted because they do not directly apply to all projects in general. Two
other principles (Maunder's numbers 7 and 13) were combined to condense the
material presented.

In addition, the notion of no obvious hidden agendas was

added to Maunder's principle number 4 and open communication was added to
Maunder's principle number 6. Moreover, the order in which Maunder presented
his principles was changed to facilitate the organization of the case study
material and subsequent analysis.
What wiU be presented in this chapter is a definition of each principle
and a brief discussion of how each principle may be established.
1. Base the project planning on careful analysis of factual situations.
All of the relevant and available facts bearing upon the land, the
people, the homes, the customs, the communities, the organizations, the institutions and the agencies operating in the area should be taken into consideration.
These facts need to be examined in relation to the objectives of the project.
Also needed in the planning process is an understanding of the recipient's desired
intentions coupled with an extensive understanding of the cultural traditions
surrounding the administration of projects.
To understand a people's religion, culture, and traditions as well as
their language not only shows an interest and concern for them but it also provides a basis from which the donor can more successfully interact with the
receiver.

Without such interest and concern a poor working relationship can
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easily emerge and the bonds favoring an efficient and successful project will not
be established. With insufficient interest and understanding by either staff and
administration, a lack of integration and interfacing exists. This can lead to a
separation which in turn can provide the seeds for a lack of a coherent project.
Proper project planning encompasses the knowledge, facts and issues
of the administration and personnel at the project site as well as in the donor
country.

A thorough examination of the recipients' plans and system of

implementation is paramount before setting forth the donor's plan and system of
implementation, the political environment of the recipients' administration needs
to be understood in order to efficiently plan the implementation of the project.
The issues to be treated by both groups of the joint-venture also must
be presented thoroughly so that a minimum of misunderstanding will ensue.
Details of the issues need to be itemized and worked on jointly in order that all
personnel are kept abreast of the thinking, actions, and problems of others.
The knowledge of the situation and the presentation of the necessary
issues provides for a means by which both parties can pursue their respective
objectives in concert with the realitites of the situation which in turn enhances
the project's success.
2. Select projects for action which concern recognized needs.
To be effective work must begin with the interests of the receiving
institution and then work toward consideration of other problems which may not
be recognized in the beginning.

Complete factual information will help

determine the priority of the projects.
Projects are intended to meet the needs for a change but before any
change can take place a recognized need by the receiver for a change is
necessary. If the need by the receiver is not yet apparent, then a relationship
has to be established by which this need can be understood and desired. The
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receiver's problems need to be diagnosed and an examination of alternative
routes and goals is needed. In addition, the goals and intended actions are to be
established. The intentions then are to be transformed into change efforts.
3. Orient the project to the existing technical, economical, and social
level of the receiving institution in order to make the project achievable.
The project needs to be oriented to the receiver. Through the factual
analysis of the receiver, the donor should know the existing technical, economic,
and social level in order to understand how to implement the project.

Also

included in this orientation, the personnel working in the area should be given a
proper briefing of what they will be doing.
Many times projects are attempted that are far too extensive for the
economic, social, and technical level of a receiving institution. Therefore, the
project ought to consider the level of education of the people to be involved,
their customs, skills, existing beliefs and the practicality of the project in the
area. The project ought to eventually become self-sufficient and self-sustaining;
therefore, the receiving institution needs to have the capacity to achieve this
purpose. Achieving this purpose demands that the sender knows the capacity of
the receiver so that that capacity may never be exceeded too much.
To be achievable the project must select a limited number of the
biggest problems which can be the most easily solved. At the same time select a
few other problems which may take a longer period to solve. Careful attention
is necessary in the problem selection in order that the problem solving in each
phase will clear the way for the next phase of the problem solving. Moreover,
such factors as finances, proper magnitude, organizational appropriateness, and
receiver skills to be established need to be carefully scrutinized.
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The finances need to be sufficient at the out-set to avoid any set back
in

the

implementation

phase

which

would

discouragement of all involved in the project.

result

in

frustration

and

The project needs to be

reasonable in its size and cost to avoid implementing a project that would not be
feasible to operate and maintain.
The correct technical rationality, which is the core instrumental
action which produces the desired output of an organization,

is essential to

implement each phase of a project at the appropriate time. In addition, there
needs to be a sufficient number of personnel qualified to administer the project
once it is operationalized.
Moreover, there needs to be sufficient interest by the local people in
learning the types of skills necessary to carry on the project and to supply the
necessary on-going qualified labor force.
Moreover, the personnel selected to administer the on-site project
ought to have an orientation concerning the religion, culture, and traditions of
the recipient country. Ideally, those selected to provide the orientation of the
religion, culture, and traditions should have lived and worked in the country and
locale for two to five years where the project is to be implemented.
Many times personnel selected for a particular project are intrigued
and enchanted by the thought of living and working in a foreign land, not to
mention the increased monetary benefits and opportunities to travel. However,
the cultural shock caused by a different style of living soon becomes a reality.
The living conditions often are not what was expected, and the adjustments
necessary for new living conditions become hectic.
If the effort is made by the donor administration of the bilateral
project to inform the personnel being considered about the living conditions, the
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sanitation precautions needed in buying, preparing and eating local food stuffs;
the housing conditions, costs, and availability; the transportation problems, needs
and costs; the schooling available and costs for their children; the social
activities available for the wives and children, etc.; then possibly the field of
applicants will weed themselves out, leaving only the serious and most interested
and qualified personnel.

In any event the personnel will be more prepared

mentally and emotionally for the new living conditions awaiting them. Fewer
adjustments will perhaps be encountered and likewise the personnel will be
happier and more productive.
The families of the personnel selected for the project often are most
affected by the site environment. Settling in assistance should be given to the
spouses. Recreational opportunities should be provided, including travel out of
the country.
When the donor administration knows the problems and circumstances
faced by the on-site personnel then the donor administration will be more
understanding and aware of the problems and the necessary planning and support
can be extended to ensure that the on-site personnel are prepared to carry out
their tasks with a minimum of frustration and hold-ups.
4. Clearly define objectives at all levels in terms that people will
understand and with no obvious hidden agendas.
The objectives at the planning stage need to be well defined.

The

objectives must give the directions in which the project is intended to develop
and how and when the personnel are to implement each stage of the project.
Each individual needs to have his tasks and authority outlined, and all
personnel need to know and understand the tasks of each other so that efforts
are not duplicated or questioned unjustly. Effective supervision to see that the
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tasks are being understood and accomplished is essential so that proper and
timely assistance can be given when an individual is not getting a task done.
Time tables of the project need to be discussed and outlined.
Deadlines are necessary and must be set and monitored to enhance effective and
smooth implementation of the project in all phases. Where problems occur, the
supervisors and personnel ought to make written reports explaining the
difficulties.
The proper

evaluation of the intended objectives will largely

determine if the objectives set forth are practical and achievable.

Moreover,

the observations and discoveries of how to better implement the different phases
or aspects of the project need to be written and evaluated by all personnel
involved in order to better understand the problems and perspectives of all
personnel.
The experiences and learning gained by the on-site personnel need to
be seriously and effectively listened to and pondered by all administrators and
other personnel. The practical aspects and on-site experience is part of the most
important information by which to determine whether the objectives were
clearly defined. The on-site experiences will suggest the need for any required
redefinitions of objectives.
The project should not have an obvious hidden agenda—that is, a
hidden purpose which would bring unstated political, economic, or personal
benefits to the donors and recipients.

Hidden agendas have the potential to

create disillusionment among the personnel and even legal problems with the
donor and recipient countries.
All issues and motives need to be discussed openly. As soon as one
counterpart discovers something awry, then the whole project is suspect in the
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minds of those who become aware of the scheme.

In all projects a common

ground of trust must be cultivated and established and adhered to. No one wants
to be cheated or manipulated and once it is discovered the project is likely to be
doomed.
The private bilateral aid project must satisfy a valid need and the
need and purpose for the project ought to be stated clearly and ethically by both
entities. To do otherwise, when realized, creates the supposition that the other
entity is trying to misuse the project for benefits other than those set forth in
the bilateral agreement.
The hidden agenda will skew the thinking of the guilty entity as it
presses for the hidden agenda goals rather than the supposed goals of the
agreement.

Such behavior is self-defeating and very detrimental to human

relations and international relations. Therefore, private bilateral aid projects
should not be undertaken if an obvious hidden agenda is involved. Honesty is still
the best good neighbor policy.
5. Use open communication and democratic methods in developing
the project.
The decision-making ought to be a bilateral process. Clear facts need
to be presented and the two organizations ought to come to a meeting of the
minds as to what would be best for the project within the scope of the financial
and labor capabilities. The major means by which bilateral decision-making can
be successful is through meaningful communication patterns.
Clear and open channels of communication to all personnel are
required. Problems as well as achievements need to be discussed regularly and
openly among the administrators and personnel.

In the event of any

dissatisfaction about the performance of any of the personnel or administrators,
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the matter ought to be confronted and discussed judiciously and tactfully. Open
channels of communication enhance opportunities of positive and negative
feedback.

This flow of feelings and ideas is needed to better understand the

ongoing process and problems of the project and provides the necessary
information to alert the proper personnel of the deficiencies, and possibly the
appropriate way to correct them.
All pertinent data requests or questions which arise by either the
donor or the recipient administrator ought to be communicated and resolved
promptly to avoid frustration and any gap in communication.
In the ease of any questionable behavior by any individual on the
project site, the issue needs to be discussed by the administrator promptly and
directly. If justified, the on-site administrator needs to report this occurance
directly to the donor administrator and not through or by some other person
directly or indirectly involved.
The proper use of communication channels can enhance democratic
decision-making by getting the personnel, especially the receiver group, more
actively involved. Since they will be the ones undergoing the changes they need
to feel that they have something invested in the project and they will feel more
responsible to help solve the problems. Their investment in the outcome of the
project and their involvement is needed to build a base to help make them selfsufficient.
6. Keep the project flexible to meet long-term situations and shortterm changes and special emergencies.
The project needs to be flexible in order to adjust to the short-term
problems or unexpected changes of time, costs, personnel, as well as other
factors. This would also be true for the long-term.
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The project needs to meet some of the immediate needs or
expectations of the receiving institution or else the interest will diminish.
Always make allowances for emergencies and to ensure the continuity and
flexibility of the project the same personnel at the project site should be kept as
a group as long as it is feasible.
If there is a lack of flexibility the short-term changes or emergencies
will not be met and the project will be in jeopardy. If the project's preliminary
goals and implementation are not achieved then the implementation of the next
phase will be hindered causing a failure to meet the needs set forth in the
project planning.
7. Make the project educational and direct it toward bringing about
improvement in the ability of the people to solve their own problems.
Any new project will be educational but the emphasis needs to be on
making it a positive educational experience for everyone.

Participation of

personnel from the receiving institution in the planning, implementation and
maintenance of the project transfers a great deal of knowledge and skills. It
puts them in direct contact with the new information and technology and
provides a hands-on experience which is the best educational process.

The

project needs to be aware of its training function and actively pursue a course
whereby all the participants of the project are provided an opportunity to be
edified through the work.
The

need

to

establish

investigated and followed through.

relevant

training

programs

should

be
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8. The project should be carried out by well-trained personnel
effectively supervised.
The proper selection of motivated personnel who are qualified,
informed and prepared for the on-site project is a necessity. The key is to obtain
truly qualified personnel who are highly experienced in the practical work they
are to carry out.
Personnel must be reasonably compatible at the on-site project and
able to work efficiently in the new environment which may include action and
thinking processes totally different than what has been experienced previously.
Avoiding the selection of personnel which may be detrimental
implementation and longevity of the project is basic.

to the

Administration and

"Technical assistance personnel must acquire a subtle and sophisticated
understanding of the problems and be sensitive of the people with whom they are
dealing . . . . the American; if he is doing his job, must be friend, teacher, leader,
critic, and above all student. At the same time, he must in some way, retain
humility, good humor and dignity."^
A give-and-take attitude of learning and understanding must be
present for a good working relationship to develop. Much learning will occur
bilaterally. Learning how to teach is as important as knowing what needs to be
taught.
The selected personnel need to make a strong commitment to do
everything possible to ensure the success of the project. This requires a unity in
the desire to work diligently together to achieve the success of the project.
Each individual needs to feel a strong obligation to help work out the problems
and bolster others in times of stress and set backs. This presupposes that the
administration developing the project and selecting the proper personnel is highly
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sensitive and aware of the character, educational, and technical qualities
needed.
9. Good project planning provides for evaluation of the results.
Evaluation is important to provide an accountability of the resources,
it presents the opportunity to orient the project to a more realistic course, and
monitoring is necessary to keep the project on tract.
Evaluation of any project is dependent upon how carefully the
objectives are defined. The objectives need to be defined in such a manner that
they can be measured and evaluated. Reports and/or records need to be made
periodically stating the status of the work in terms of the desired objectives.
Many social objectives are somewhat intangible but with sufficient effort the
terms of the desired action can be defined and appraised. The evaluation of the
objectives are based on proper measurement criteria of the objectives and the
proper collection of information to be used in the measurement process.
By orienting the project to the realistic situation and problems the
needs can be more clearly defined.

Involving the receiver in the planning can

lead to a more acceptable and workable project for both parties. Providing the
proper internal management criteria will aid in the preparation of the on-site
personnel of both groups to be better oriented as to why and how the project is
to be implemented.

Developing the project for the receiver to take over the

project will better focus and facilitate the educational and training procedures
so that the receivers will help solve their own problems and become selfsufficient.

In addition, allowing for proper evaluation can determine the

effectiveness of the planning, implementation, achievements, and failures of a
project. The periodic monitoring coupled with the other points mentioned above
will enhance the probability of a project achieving its objectives.

CHAPTER 3
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE STUDY;
THE ADS-BYU DAIRY PROJECT
The Arab Development Society (ADS) is a school and training center
for Palestinian orphan boys. Three miles from modern Jericho, Israel is a land
concession registered to the Arab Development Society. This concession in the
1950Ts originally encompassed 5,000 acres of arid wasteland lying some 1000 feet
below sea level. The temperature may reach as high as 120 degrees Fahrenheit
in August with an average daily reading of 100 degrees through the summer
months.

Two miles to the west lies the Jordan River which drops to

approximately 1300 feet below sea level. It is upon this land, which lies on both
sides of the road that links Jerusalem and Amman, that Musa Alami, with the
help of the ADS and funds from other institutions, built an oasis for refugee
orphan boys.
Alami was born May 8, 1897 in Jerusalem and was educated in law at
Cambridge University in England. He practiced law in Palestine and was active
in Middle East politics and by 1933 had become the Attorney General in the
British Administration. This civil service post made Alami the highest ranking
Palestinian in politics during the British mandate period.

He held this civil

service position until 1937, when he was dismissed after being charged for
negligence in the prosecution of Arabs accused of sabbotage. The guilty Arabs
were sometimes acquitted; however, the acquittals occurred during Alami's
absence. The prosecutions had been undertaken by a senior British officer,
17
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who was standing in for Alami while he was in Karlsbad (Europe) undergoing
o

medical treatment. Alami was subsequently exiled in 1937 to Lebanon0 and was
not able to return to Palestine until May 1941.

Even during his exile, Alami was

active in Arab politics. He was a member of the Palestine Arab delegation to
the London Conference in 1939 10 and after his return to Palestine he was
appointed to represent Palestine at the Arab conference in Alexandria, Egypt in
1944. 11
Alami by March 1945 was determined to aid the plight of the
Palestinian farmers and peasants and was instrumental in founding the ADS for
this purpose.

However, the ADS was not very successful in achieving its goals

of aiding the farmers and peasants and with the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the aims
of the ADS had to be altered.
Originally there was no water on the land, and experts had said there
was not any fresh subterranean water.

Alami was not to be denied the

experience of at least trying to find water on the land. In 1949 the first well was
dug mostly by hand.

Alami had hired Palestinian refugees from the nearby

refugee camp. At the 75 foot level fresh water was found. Other wells were
dug, and by 1953 ten pumps were raising 200,000 gallons of water per hour/
An experimental crop production farm had been begun; then in the
early 1950's a poultry project was implemented, and within two years the farm
was producing 80,000 birds.
In the early 1950's the orphanage had been started with some 18 young
Palestinian boys. These boys were housed in buildings that had been built at the
time the first well was being dug to house the well diggers and their families.
Later more dormitories, shops and other buildings were added, as was a large
swimming pool for the boys.
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Development of the Initial Idea
By the late 1950's Alami was pondering the idea of establishing a
dairy on the land concession to provide milk and milk products for the boys.
Alami was seeking help to achieve this new venture. In 1958, the American aid
program, which was known at that time as "Point IV," had become interested in
the refugee boystown. Point IV ". . . provided the funds for the education and
subsistence of 100 extra boys . . . " 1 4

bringing the total to 160. The Ford

Foundation donated money for dormitories and classrooms.
Alami Meets Bigler in Utah
Dale Clark, then a banker in Farmington, Utah, in 1959, had been
interested in Alami's refugee boys' ranch as early as 1951 as a result of his
involvement in the Point IV program in the Middle East.

Clark had known of

Alami's desire for a dairy project, as did Hugh Walker of the Ford Foundation.
These men made arrangements for Alami to meet Bert Bigler in the Spring of
1959, a Jersey dairy owner in West Jordan, Utah. Norman Burns, the director of
the United States Government Economics Aid Program in Jordan and a relative
to Bigler, had given Alami an envelope containing Bigler's address in Utah. 15
Burns had written a note on the envelope introducing Alami to Bigler. Upon
Alami's arrival in Utah, he requested Bigler's help in locating and purchasing all
the equipment necessary to set up the milking parlor and milk processing plant at
the refugee boystown.
Clark became responsible for the Ford Foundation's funds which had
been provided for the purchase of the dairy equipment. Alami told Bigler to buy
all the equipment from the United States and to buy only the best.
wanted the project to be the best equipped dairy in the Middle East.

Alami
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The dairy equipment had been purchased in and around the state of
Utah, forwarded to the Rynn Export Company in New York and then shipped to
the Port of Aqaba on the north end of the Red Sea. The equipment was then
trucked to the boystown near Jericho, Jordan. (Before the 1967 Arab-Israeli War
Jericho was still part of Jordan).
The Ford Foundation had already given the ADS grants amounting to
some three million dollars over the years to aid the refugee boys. In addition,
the Ford Foundation agreed to help with the dairy, if Alami could get the cows
and a dairyman to supervise the project.
Ernest Wilkinson Becomes Involved
Shortly after Alami met Bigler in the spring of 1959, Clark also
approached Ernest L. Wilkinson, President of Brigham Young University (BYU) in
Provo, Utah operated by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS or
Mormon Church). Clark tried to interest Wilkinson in involving BYU and the LDS
Church in the dairy project. 16

Clark's intent was to have President Wilkinson

interest the LDS Church President, David O. McKay, in the project. Therefore,
the LDS Church could play a role by way of its educational institution in a
private bilateral foreign aid project.
President Wilkinson was known as a man who got things done. It was
felt that if he could be sold on the ADS dairy project, the project would have a
better chance of becoming a reality.

On a nondated piece of paper Wilkinson

stated, "Three men came to see me from Jordan:

Cy Fryer, International

Development Service (IDS), Alami, lyad Affefi (no title given), and M. L. Wilson,
17
who had been the head of the "New Deal" under President Truman."x<
In

addition, Hugh Walker, the director of the Ford Foundation for the Middle East,
and Alami had visited Wilkinson in the spring of 1959. Walker had previously
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asked Clark if ". . . we out in Utah can give them assistance in personnel—they
I Q

(ADS) have a preference for our people [the LDS or Mormon people]"
On May 5, 1959, President Wilkinson received a letter from Fryer
stating:
Your letter of April 29th brought us joy. I am glad you met Hugh
Walker and that truly great Arab friend of ours Mussa Bey Alami.
You will see more of Mussa Bey, when you come to Jordan and
examine some of the work he is doing, with the help of the Ford
Foundation, among the refugees in Jordan. I am looking forward to
joining with Hugh to take you there and to seeing Jerusalem and
some of the problems of the people in and around it through your
eyes. 9
Hugh Walker had written a letter expressing his delightful experience visiting
with Wilkinson and his colleagues on the BYU campus.

"Musa Alami was

extremely impressed with not only the individuals he met, but with the
atmosphere that prevailed. "°
Wilkinson Visits the ADS Project
Wilkinson visited the ADS project in June 1959 and upon his return to
Provo, Utah he made a report listing many details of what Alami wanted in
personnel, the accommodations for them, and their salary. Moreover, Wilkinson
said,
Because of the great work that Musa Bey Alami is doing, I am very
desirous that we find three or four men to furnish him, I have a
personal conviction we will do much more good in a great private
enterprise of this kind that is being watched all over Jordan rather
than to help some government enterprise.
In addition he stated,
If you are successful in getting the right kind of men for Musa Bey
Alami, I am sure that we will bring students to BYU each year
from Jordan. They will have two students to enter in the fall of
1960 and probably two each year thereafter. The BYU could exert
a great influence in this backward state of Jordan.
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In early December 1959, Edwin Butterworth of the Deseret News
heard of Brigham Young University's interest in the dairy project at Jericho and
requested a "news story on a mission to the state of Jordan which is being
administered by BYU. L. B. Bigler of West Jordan, Utah is one of the participants, I understand." 22 President Wilkinson wrote to Butterworth explaining that
BYU was not going to administer any mission in the State of Jordan. Wilkinson
had been worried about how the Israelis would view the project. He did not want
to arouse their attention. This is why in 1959 he wanted a low profile and had
stated
I am merely acting as a personal representative of Honorable Musa
Bey Alami, one of the great leaders of Jordan in trying to recruit
certain technicians for the ADS, a private company which operates
a boy's school in Jordan . . . . The BYU officially is not a party to
it at all . . . . It turns out that Bigler is quite a publicity seeker.
But we must give no publicity to this. When and if Bigler and
others are actually engaged by the ADS, I think that an article in
the newspapers telling about it would be appropriate. All that we
can claim, however, is that BYU has helped to recruit this staff.
Alami wrote a letter to Bigler in July of 1960, expressing his desire to
start the dairy farm as soon as possible. "I request you to try and obtain the
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necessary number of head of cattle to start this farm."

In a letter to

Wilkinson the same month, Alami talked of using KLM to fly the donated cattle.
Alami had quoted $15,000 for shipping the cattle, but KLM's price was $17,500.
Alami was willing to pay the difference himself, if the cattle could be ready by
November 1960.

Alami stated, "I am hoping that you will be able to get my

Mormon good friends to make this a truely Mormon project which you and
President

McKay

can

dedicate

and

have

formally

start

sometime

in

December." 25
In August 1960, Dr. Rudger H. Walker, the new Dean of Agriculture,
became involved in the Alami project.

Walker had just returned from Iran,

where he had been head of the "Point IV" program for Utah State University. 26
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Wilkinson sent a memorandum to Walker informing him that Alami had requested
that BYU try to get 30 to 40 heifers donated by the American Jersey Association
or some other association for the ADS. Wilkinson had explained that Bigler had
been attempting to get the heifers donated by the Jersey Association, but had
received negative responses from two of the officers. Now Alami was asking for
BYU's help in obtaining the animals. Wilkinson was now beginning to exert his
influence as President of BYU to involve the LDS Church. Wilkinson had told R.
H. Walker that BYU, with the consent of the Church, would advance $15,000 or
more for transportation of the cattle to Jordan.
Bigler to Stay Only Six Months
Hugh Walker of the Ford Foundation in Beirut, Lebanon learned from
Alami that Bigler would be coming to Jericho and that he personally would select
the cattle. Bigler was planning to go to Jericho for six months to help set up the
dairy project.

"The wonderful news regarding the cattle and equipment has

certainly spread throughout this area and everyone is anxiously awaiting the date
Bigler will arrive. 2 7
By the end of August 1960, Bigler was having trouble getting the
cattle donated and had written to Alami and explained the situation.

Bigler

wanted to buy the cattle in Europe with the funds Wilkinson was arranging to
have donated to cover the cost of transportation.

Alami wrote to Wilkinson

stating that
This is distressing news to me because of the publicity that has
already been made about a "BYU Project" all over the area, and
because of the terrible disappointment that everybody here will
have.' 50
Alami was billing the project as a "BYU project" but it was not
officially one. President Wilkinson was still assuming that the LDS Church would
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donate the needed money to ship the dairy cattle to Jericho. Wilkinson was of
the opinion that BYU would be authorized to utilize the funds for purchasing and
shipment of the cattle as had been discussed before.

However, he needed to

obtain financial clearance on this before they could go ahead with the program.
R. H. Walker did not feel that they would be delayed on this matter and they
could move ahead as soon as they obtained the added information they needed
from the Agricultural attache in Europe and other sources which they had been
working on.
R. H. Walker was pleased to hear that Alami was thinking in terms of
the project being a BYU project. Therefore, R. H. Walker felt that some special
emphasis should be given upon arrival of the cattle to the role BYU was playing.
on

Good pictures and public relations should be given much consideration.
A temporary set back occurred when President Wilkinson received a
call from Wendell Mendenhall, chairman of the Building Committee of the LDS
Church, in which Wilkinson was informed that the Committee did not appropriate
the funds for the purchase of cattle. The Committee apparently had a number of
questions to ask about the on-site preparation for the acceptance, feeding, and
caring for the cattle once they arrived at Jericho. R. H. Walker was asked by
Wilkinson to see Mendenhall and explain the situation in Jericho; as well as
Walker's experiences in the Middle East and his membership on the board of
directors of the American University at Beirut. 3
R. H. Walker's Ploy for BYU's Management Control
As the involvement of Wilkinson and Brigham Young University increased, Wilkinson grew more uneasy with Bigler's level of involvement. The
personality conflict between Wilkinson and Bigler was of Wilkinson's own making
as he became more involved in the project. Even though Wilkinson had recom-
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mended Bigler as the dairyman to go to the ADS project near Jericho, he felt
that Grant Richards, a dairy specialist at BYU would have been a better
choice.
In a memorandum dated November 9, 1960, Wilkinson agreed with R.
H. Walker that it was most unfortunate that Alami made direct arrangements
with Bigler to buy the dairy equipment, because it was felt that Bigler and Alami
had unrealistic aspirations.

Wilkinson suggested that

R. H. Walker write to

Alami and tell him what he felt on this issue, explaining that they did not want a
large plant to lie idle and be a monument to their mistakes of building a plant
qo

beyond their needs, *
Following the conversation of R. H. Walker and Wilkinson concerning
Bigler, Walker reviewed the correspondence on the entire project and their
relationship with Bigler. According to the information R. H. Walker obtained
from the Wilkinson files, Bigler was selected for the assignment by Dr. Hallam
and Dale Clark.

Apparently his qualifications were reviewed by Wilkinson, and

Bigler on occasion had met with Wilkinson to discuss the problems of the dairy
project.

However, Wilkinson did not have all the facts in his file concerning

Bigler's involvement and Alami's intentions at the project site. R. H. Walker was
not well informed on the details of the ADS project, and Wilkinson was not able
to inform him properly.

R. H. Walker had never discussed the scope of the

project with Alami or Bigler. He failed to discuss any issues with others involved
in the project except Wilkinson.

Walker did not obtain understanding of the

problems nor was he sensitive enough to the people with whom he was dealing.
Wilkinson had asked Walker to keep abreast of the project, but he eventually
developed his own plan of involving BYU directly with full management control.
In a memorandum to President Wilkinson, R. H. Walker expressed his
view that Alami was really counting on BYU for their help and cooperation.

26
Walker stated that if the Mormon Church was authorizing Brigham Young
University to spend the funds to support the dairy project, then they should pick
up the ball and proceed with the program as a Brigham Young University project
under complete management of Brigham Young University. In this way Walker
et al. could determine what was going to be done and who was going to do it. On
the basis of this premise Walker made the following recommendations:
1. That when the finance committee of the Church makes the
funds available they do so on condition that the project be under
the complete control of BYU, and that the BYU designate one of
its staff members to fill the position on Alami's school where he
will serve as leader of the dairy development project. In doing so
it is to be understood that the ADS will pay the salary and furnish
the transportation and housing for this BYU staff member during
the time of his assignment to the project, which is to be not less
than 2 years, including normal vacation periods in accordance with
University practices.
2. That Seymour Mikkelsen be asked to take this assignment for
the next 2 years, and at the same time he be assured of his position
at BYU upon completion of his assignment on this project. 4
Walker and Wilkinson had discussed and agreed that, when the funds
were allocated, BYU should have full responsibility for the project, which
included the expenditure of funds and the selection and designation of the
personnel to be appointed by the ADS to participate in the establishment of the
dairy project.

Mikkelsen's name was submitted, and it was further suggested

that the funds be set up to BYU without reference to Bigler, and that BYU be
given the responsibility for the overall supervision of the project, including the
working relationship with the ADS, the expenditure of the funds and the
selection of personnel to be employed.
On November 16, 1960 Wilkinson received an approval from the LDS
Church expenditure committee for the use of a sum not to exceed $17,500.
Wilkinson immediately wrote to Alami stating the restrictions on the funds.
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In the first place, the committee does not feel it is advisable for us
to spend this much money in reliance upon having Mr. Bigler go to
Jordan for a period of only six months. If it meets with your
approval, we are therefore advising him that we do not think it
wise for him to go, but rather that we are going to send Mr.
Seymour Mikkelsen, who is a member of our animal husbandry staff
at BYU and who will stay for two years. He has also good
mechanical aptitude, and if he is sent we do not believe it will be
necessary to send anyone else to assemble the dairy equipment. He
will be able to do that himself.
The second limitation laid down by my Expenditures Committee is
that there be some definite understanding between you and Mr.
Mikkelsen before he goes as to his compensation. 6
BYU Officially Becomes Involved
The November 16, 1960 approval of the funds by the LDS Church
Expenditure Committee and the restrictions on the funds gave Wilkinson and R.
H. Walker the necessary tool to have BYU become officially involved in the
administration of selecting, buying, and shipping the dairy animals as well as the
selection of personnel to accomplish this, m addition, BYU selected personnel to
set up and operate the dairy equipment which Bigler had begun purchasing in
early 1959 and had sent to the ADS near Jericho at Alami's request.
As early as December 8, 1959, Wilkinson had recommended Bigler to
the ADS to be employed to oversee the dairy project development in Jericho. He
also sent the names of Ralph Ashton and Eugene Drake. ' Moreover, in early
August Dr. Hallam, the Dean of the College of Biological and Agricultural
Sciences at BYU before R. H. Walker's appointment, had given Bigler the
assignment to help locate men to form a team of three to go to Jordan. °
Ashton and Drake had been Bigler's selections to go with him as the poultry and
horticulturalist experts.
Wilkinson had related

to R. H. Walker before

he made his

recommendations to the LDS Church Expenditure Committee that Alami had
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met and dealt with Bigler before Wilkinson had ever seen A l a m i / 9

Therefore,

the restrictions recommended by R. H. Walker concerning the LDS Church
donation presented a potentially volatile situation since Bigler had not been
contacted nor consulted as to this major shift which would totally eliminate him
and the men he had selected to go with him.
On November 23, 1960, seven days after Wilkinson received the
official word that the funds by the LDS Church had been approved, R. H. Walker
sent a letter to Bigler explaining the decision of the Church Expenditure
Committee. The decision was the adoption of the recommendations by Wilkinson
and R. H. Walker. He stated that the purpose for the decision was to promote a
stronger and closer working relationship between faculty members of the two
educational institutions. To accomplish these objectives it was the unanimous
opinion of R. H. Walker, Wilkinson, et al. that a BYU faculty member should be
given the responsibility of carrying out the work under the dairy cattle program.
The consideration of sending a BYU faculty member and his wife for
at least two years and placing BYU in full control necessitated a drastic change
in the plans which R. K. Walker and Bigler had discussed. Bigler was told for the
first time that BYU had designated Seymour Mikkelsen as its representative on
the dairy project. He and his wife were given the responsibility for selecting and
purchasing the cattle and transporting them to Jericho. Mikkelsen was asked to
serve as a member of the teaching faculty conducting classes in dairy cattle
production, feeding, management, as well as the handling and processing of milk
and milk sanitation at the boystown.
R. H. Walker apologized to Bigler for the major change in plans and
he understood how disturbing and disappointing it would be to Bigler.

Walker

expressed his regret but said that the plans had to be changed to clarify the
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responsibility and role of BYU in the dairy project. It was on this basis that the
funds were made available. President Wilkinson expressed his deep and sincere
appreciation for the interest and enthusiasm that Bigler had shown in the
project.

He felt that Bigler's contribution was very helpful in developing the

dairy project at the boystown.
R. H, Walker desired to follow up with Bigler and Clark on the
purchase and shipment of the dairy processing equipment. R. H. Walker had not
been involved in any of the equipment procurement and had no idea of what had
been done or what yet needed to be done. Therefore, Walker desired to meet
with Bigler and Clark to get the details of what was yet needed to complete the
dairy equipment phase of the project.
The recommendations by R. H. Walker created some misunderstanding
with Alami and Bigler. Bigler told Alami in a letter that BYU had waited several
days to tell him he was not going to Jericho. This was only seven days before he
was to have left and he had been ready to leave since November 1.

Bigler

indicated he had spent $1,600 in labor getting ready for the project, anticipating
he would be paid with wages from the project when it got underway.

Walker

indicated he did not realize Bigler was so deeply involved in the project and he
felt the University should send Bigler, even though they had arranged to send the
Mikkelsens. R. H. Walker seemed to have favored Wilkinson's plan to eliminate
Bigler from the project until he was confronted by Bigler. Then he changed back
to favoring Bigler.
R. H, Walker was playing politics. In one letter he was telling Alami
that Bigler was not the dairyman to send and in another he was expressing his
hope that it would be feasible for Bigler to travel with the Mikkelsens for
49

assistance and support.

R. H. Walker did not understand the relationship
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Bigler and Alami had already developed. Alami sent a telegram to R. H. Walker
stating his desire for Bigler and Hogan to come for six months and the
Mikkelsens could follow for two years. Bigler had informed Walker and Alami
that Mikkelsen had expressed his doubts as to whether he could install the
equipment. Alami related this to Walker, and it was this statement by Bigler
that promoted his preference for Bigler and Hogan. Bigler was promoting his
aspiration, as was R. H. Walker.
Meanwhile, Alami wrote to Bigler stating that he was distressed to
hear that BYU had decided to send Mr. and Mrs. Mikkelsen to start the dairy
project and stay for two years. Alami understood that Wilkinson had informed
Bigler of the new plan. Although Alami was disappointed that things turned out
as they did, he wanted Bigler to know how much he appreciated him for his
enthusiasm and labor put forth in the project. Alami also invited Bigler to travel
to the project and stay as Alami's guest for any length of time, all at Alami's
expense.
Alami told Bigler of a shipload of gifts which was going to Jordan
sometime in May or June. It was possible that Alami could arrange for Mr. and
Mrs. Bigler to travel aboard the ship. Alami said nothing would please him more
than to have the Biglers go to Jericho.

He stated that all the boys at the

boystown had been looking forward to meeting Bigler because they had heard so
much about his interest in their welfare. Alami said that this was no ordinary
gesture, rather it was a sincere invitation to come to Jericho.
Wilkinson had called Bigler and told him to fire the men that he had
lined up to go to Jericho—Ashton, poultry; Drake, horticulturalist.

Wilkinson

indicated he was going to hire his own men including a replacement for Bigler.
Bigler was disappointed and hurt, but he knew that the project could go farther
with BYU backing it. 4 4
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The night after Wilkinson called Bigler, Mr. and Mrs. Mikkelsen went
to see the Biglers and told them that Wilkinson had chosen them to go to
Jericho.

Mikkelsen and Bigler had been raised in the same Utah community,

Fountain Green, and Mikkelsen did not want to go to Jericho if it meant hard
feelings with Bigler. Mikkelsen knew that Bigler had worked hard in preparation
for the project and Mikkelsen felt badly about the change of plans eliminating
Bigler from going to Jericho to assist in starting the dairy. R. H. Walker also
visited the Biglers to apologize for the change of plans. R. H. Walker informed
Bigler that the Mikkelsens would be representing BYU since the funds were
donated by the LDS Church through BYU. Bigler's wife, Hazel, was especially
upset and both Mr. and Mrs. Bigler felt that they had been double-crossed by
Wilkinson.
Meanwhile, Bigler and Hogan, a Utah dairyman, were still working on
getting all the equipment purchased and shipped. Hogan and Bigler had spent
two days with Dr. Morris of Utah State University at Logan, Utah making sure
that all of the equipment was adequate and top of the line.

Morris was

considered to be the best authority in the country on processing milk and milk
products. Bigler stated that most all the equipment had been selected and was
on the way to New York City. The equipment and expenses at this point totalled
almost $22,000.

This left approximately $5,000 for additional purchases and

shipping fees. R. H. Walker needed to buy the dairy stock to send to Jericho. 4 5
Eventually the decision was made to send Bigler with Mikkelsen in
order to help get the project underway. Wilkinson had agreed to this as long as
Alami paid Bigler's way.

Walker stated that the Mikkelsens and Bigler were

practically ready to travel and hoped that they could leave around the first of
January 1961. On January 12, 1961, Bigler received the official word that he
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was to accompany Mikkelsen to assist in the purchase of the dairy stock and in
4fi

arrangement for their shipment to Jericho.
Purchase of the Dairy Cattle
The purchase of the dairy stock was finally getting underway after
many months of thinking, planning and obtaining the funds. January 17 Bigler
and Mikkelsen visited nearly all the dairies in Holland selecting the cattle. Then
it was necessary to wait 26 days for the cattle to be assembled, vaccinated, and
released by the government before they could be shipped.

While making the

purchase arrangements, Mikkelsen received a letter from Peter Dekker, a cattle
dealer suggested by the Agricultural Attache'' in Holland, who acted as a clearing
house for the BYU dairy cattle purchasing committee, informing them that the
best way to send the cattle would be by boat, especially since the insurance
company had agreed to cover the risk of shipping the cattle not only to Aqaba
but also by truck from Aqaba to Jericho. They also discovered that shipping the
cattle by boat rather than by airplane would cost $5,000, leaving much more
money to buy cattle.

Bigler called Alami in London to have him arrange for

trucks to haul the cattle from Aqaba to Jericho. 4 7
Sixteen head of calves, ten bred heifers and one bull were purchased
from various farms throughout Holland. Dekker took care of all the details for
the preparation and shipment of the cattle to Jericho by steamship. The ship
48

left Rotterdam in mid February, and the trip took 15 days. °
While Bigler was in Holland he had sent a letter to President Henry D.
Moyle stating that when he had been set apart in January 1961 as a missionary he
was instructed to report directly to the First Presidency of the LDS Church.
Wilkinson had arranged for Bigler and Mikkelsen to be set apart as missionaries
in the event that they would have the opportunity to hold meetings or teach the
gospel. This can be classified as a hidden agenda and it is apparent that most

33
projects entered into by the LDS Church have the underlying purpose of
promoting public relations and missionary opportunities.

In this letter dated

January 27, 1961, Bigler had said:
I think it extremely wise that instruction be sent to Brother
and Sister Mikkelsen regarding their personal conduct while in
Jordan especially Sister Mikkelsen to put it bluntly she is very
crude with her language—her habits and her dress. She goes around
here in cowboy boots, pants and overalls and cowboy shirts. It's
creating a false impression of our LDS women. She says she
believes in being herself. I told her she should be better than
herself and try to improve and not to do and say things that would
cause regrets later. I told her to be cautious and not to do or say
anything until she was sure of everything, to put her toe in the
water before jumping in all over. It didn't seem to do much good.
She told the waiter last evening the steer he served her was still
bellering. She is too familiar.
Her husband was with me when I tried to correct her and he
didn't seem to mind one way or another how she acted, dressed or
spoke. I make it a strict point to never be by her side alone or
while we are walking. She is a good woman and means well I am
sure. I don't want to give a wrong impression of her goodness and
virtue—she needs strict council and I believe she would take it.
Upon receiving this letter President Wilkinson commented that it was
evidence showing the wisdom for not having put Bigler in charge.

It is not

evident what Wilkinson's thinking was when he made this statement about Bigler,
but if indeed Bigler's remarks about Mrs. Mikkelsen were true, then from an LDS
or even an American image standpoint, Bigler had a valid concern which needed
some attention.
Wilkinson turned this matter over to R. H. Walker and he drafted a
letter to be sent to the Mikkelsens. In his letter Walker explained that most of
the people in the Middle East are Muslims belonging to the Islamic religion. He
suggested that they study the religion and culture of the people.

This was

necessary for them to understand the people better and to help them understand
how they could best live and work with them. Walker stated that the Muslims
respect Mormon people for their standards and beliefs, however, they forbid
them to actively proselyte among them. Since the Mikkelsens were employed by
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the ADS, Walker felt it better that they teach Mormonism only by setting a fine
example by the way they lived.

They would have to be patient and let the

interested Muslims contact them to know more about their way of life and the
religion which teaches it. When they approach the Mikkelsens then they could
explain the gospel and what it does for the people.
Walker explained that visitors from the West to Jordan cannot always
do things just as they are accustomed to doing them in the West. Muslim women
for example have played a secluded role and even veiled their faces in the past.
This and other customs need to be respected without trying to change them.
Because of this Walker suggested that Mrs. Mikkelsen may need to be more
reserved in the things she would do in Jordan than at home in the West. It was
emphasized that it was important for an American abroad to remember that
he/she is really representing America, and in the Mikkelsens' case they were
representing the LDS Church as well.
About this same time Wilkinson had been informed that Mrs.
Mikkelsen, before leaving Jordan, had expressed the desire to go swimming with
the boys in Jericho. Wilkinson was concerned that this would be a breach of the
native customs. He wrote to Alami asking him to properly advise Mrs. Mikkelsen
on this p o i n t . "
The Mikkelsens were encouraged to go to Amman and get in touch
with officials of the United States Operations Missions and discuss with them the
things that would help them understand the customs and culture in order to avoid
problems.

Walker stated that employees of the American Embassy and other

United States government agencies are given rather extensive courses in orientation when they are assigned to a foreign country. This is a tremendous help for
them to understand the people with whom they are working. This improves the
relationships of the individuals as well as the countries as a whole.
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There was no further correspondence on this topic and Wilkinson was
never informed whether the Mikkelsens ever followed R. H. Walker's advice to
seek help from the American Embassy on matters of customs and religion.
The Mikkelsens and Bigler flew to Jerusalem and drove to the
boystown. A couple of days after their arrival in Jericho, Norman Burns had the
United States government publicity men there to get the full story about the
cattle.

They were going to meet the boat at Aqaba and take movies as the

cattle were unloaded. This was to be published throughout the Middle East in
Arabic and English.

On February 27, 1961, Burns, some "Point VI" men,

Mikkelsen, and men from the boystown went 250 miles south of Jericho to the
port of Aqaba on the Red Sea to see the cattle arrive. They were accompanied
by the international news reporter and the United States Information Service
people. 52
Dairy Cattle Arrive at Aqaba
The ship, Mima Lloyd, docked at 1:00 p.m., on Thursday, March 2,
1961, and by 5:00 p.m. the cattle had been loaded onto trucks.

The cattle

arrived in excellent condition and traveled the Aqaba highway to Jericho which
was basically the same route which Moses and the Children of Israel traveled
after crossing the Red Sea.

It remains a true wilderness area.

The trucks

arrived around 5:00 a.m. the next morning at the project without incidents.
Bigler related that Jordanian, German, and American newspapermen
had been at Aqaba and at Jericho. It was said by Bigler that this event had been
the most gala affair Aqaba and Jordan had ever had. Bigler felt that he had been
treated like a king and stated that Alami had told everyone that Bigler was
completely responsible for the dairy being established in Jordan.

Bigler was

embarrassed when the Arabs saw him and met him, because they knew him from
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the radio and newspaper reports. He felt that the cattle had really made news
all over the Middle East. 5 3
An article in the Jerusalem Times carried the following headline:
"U.S. Donates Jordan 27 Hoistein Cattle." 5 4 The article explained that the funds
for the livestock were contributed by the Mormon Church in Salt Lake City,
Utah after Alami, President of the ADS, explained to President David O. McKay,
President of the Mormon Church, the purpose of the farm and school and his
desires to start a modern dairy.

The article stated that the cattle had been

purchased in Holland by Mr. Bigler, a prominent businessman in West Jordan,
Utah, and Mr. Mikkelsen, Director of the Livestock Program at Brigham Young
University in Provo, Utah. Mikkelsen would remain in Jericho for two years to
assist in the establishment and operation of the dairy.
The new modern dairy was to soon be producing sanitary dairy
products for Jordan as well as give practical training to hundreds of boys working
with the dairy cattle and manufacturing the dairy products. 55 In actuality, very
few boys were interested in the dairy cattle and relatively few were trained to
work with the cows and the milk processing equipment. Most of the boys were
interested in wood and metal shop and culturally the women were the ones who
took care of the animals.
Many people were enthusiastic about this dairy project. Among them
was Norman Burns. Burns stated that he knew from experience that aid from
one private organization to another was very effective because it goes directly
from the people of one country to the people of another. He was proud that his
countrymen from the State of Utah had developed on their own initiative this
cooperative project with the ADS which was doing so much to improve the
agricultural and rural life in Jordan. 5 6
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Burns sent a letter to R. H. Walker informing him that Hugh Walker,
Beirut representative of the Ford Foundation, and Cleon Swayzee, of the New
York office of the Ford Foundation, were going to Jericho on March 6 to see
Alami, Mikkelsen, and Bigler.

Burns believed that the project was well

underway, especially with the Mikkelsens staying with the project in Jericho to
see it through the critical first year. He mentioned that the Ford people were as
enthusiastic about the project as were Bigler and the Mikkelsens.
Bigler's enthusiasm is evident by his statement in a card to R H.
Walker dated March 1961 which stated that they (Bigler and Mikkelsen) were
going to tell the world about the project. 57

However, President Wilkinson did

not appreciate all the publicity the dairy project was getting through Bigler. He
stated that the man had no discretion.

Wilkinson had been holding off on the

publicity, but he decided that maybe now they ought to release some articles on
the dairy project.
Wilkinson was also concerned that Bigler was leaving Israel so soon.
Bigler had informed Wilkinson that he was returning March 12. Wilkinson felt
that he had barely arrived and he asked R. H. Walker if there was any reason at
all for keeping him in Israel longer.
R. H. Walker had received a letter from Mikkelsen stating that he was
well pleased with the project in Jericho. Walker, therefore, felt that it was the
right time for a publicity item and that it was best to let Bigler return home as
he had planned.

His contribution had already been made, and there was no

purpose for him to stay in Jericho any longer. 58
The letter which R. H. Walker received from Mikkelsen stated that
the school and the whole ADS was an outstanding institution in the Middle East.
In addition, Mikkelsen explained that there were 160 boys, several teachers,
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businessmen at Jericho, and an office in Jerusalem. The help that was being sent
could not be measured in money.

Rather it is giving a way of life to an

underprivileged people and they are responding in a positive way. Mikkelsen felt
that Alami would be numbered among the great men of that day.
Moreover, Mikkelsen stated that March 10 was the first time that he
was able to see the heifers together. They were very uniform in size and type.
One would not suspect that they had come from eighteen different herds. The
cattle were of very good quality, and three of them had come from the highest
producing herds in Holland. Alami was most happy with the cattle. He had been
to see the cattle four times that day showing them to important Jordanian
officials. 5 *
Publicity Widespread
The dairy cattle project received a lot of attention. Many newspaper
articles were published which described some of the details of the project. The
United Press International in an article entitled "West Jordan, Jordan, owes a
life long and life-saving debt to the citizens of West Jordan, Utah," 60 by Zuhdi
Sabah discussed the live-saving debt owed to the citizens of West Jordan, Utah
by the citizens of that West Jordan, Jordan. They made it possible for the first
modern dairy in Jordan. However, the whole ADS project came from the efforts
of Musa Alami, a Palestinian who gave up his successful law practice in 1949 to
begin a lonesome crusade.

Alami tried to provide a home and education for

hundreds of homeless boys. He tried to give them opportunities to learn, grow
and restore their human dignity. This article was erroneous in the sequence of
buying the cattle and then the dairy processing equipment. The equipment was
bought and shipped to Jordan before the cattle were bought in Holland.

In

addition, the article was erroneous stating that Mikkelsen helped look for cows in
America. He was only involved in selecting the cattle in Holland.

39
An article entitled "West Jordan Helps Mid-East Name Sake"

was

not written to President Wilkinson's liking. The article was written as if the
dairy project was a West Jordan, Utah and Bigler project rather than a BYU
project. The article was apparently written in the Middle East with the help of
ideas and information from Bigler.

President Wilkinson was upset that the

publicity on the dairy project did not bill it exclusively as a BYU project. In a
letter to Bigler Wilkinson stated that the First Presidency of the LDS Church had
sent Bigler's letter to Wilkinson inasmuch as the dairy project was a BYU rather
than a Church project.

Once Bigler was back home in Utah, Wilkinson felt

better about the fact that he no longer had to deal with Bigler in the project.
Likewise, Wilkinson wrote a letter to Hugh Walker expressing his desire to be
kept informed of Mikkelsen's activities on the boystown project, whether they
were critical or noncritical. 64
There had been additional talk of Hogan going to Jericho to install the
equipment, and Alami sent Bigler a telegram asking if Hogan could arrive before
Alami's departure from Jericho on May 14, 1961. 65 Mikkelsen wrote to Bigler
expressing his frustration at the slow progress on building the milking parlor.
Construction work just did not move as fast in Jericho as he was used to in the
United States.

The mangers had not been started, but the calf pens and

maternity pens were finished and were really nice.

Pictures of the milking

parlor had arrived to show Alami how everything ought to fit together.
Mikkelsen said it was difficult working with Alami, since he did not seem to
understand how important it was to get the measurements exact.
All the equipment except the spare parts had arrived by April 25,
1961, but none could be installed until the milking parlor and processing plant
had been completed. However, six cows had come fresh and the Arab boys were
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learning to milk the cows. Mikkelsen stated that the Arab boys and the Dutch
cows did not get along too well.
The alfalfa was growing well, except that it was harvested in an
archaic manner. They were still using the scythe and carrying the dried alfalfa
off the field by hand and loading it on a trailer and hauling it to the stack.
Alami had had a harvester ordered, but he canceled it, hoping that someone
would donate one to the boystown. Flies were another problem, and the sprays
used were not very effective.
Mikkelsen Expresses Need for Equipment Mechanic
Mikkelsen and Alami discussed the dairy situation. Mikkelsen stated
that Alami really needed Hogan in Jericho to set up the dairy equipment.

The

floor was being poured in the milking parlor, and soon the processing floor would
be poured. Mikkelsen needed Hogan to make a rough sketch for the arrangement
of the equipment in order to know where the interior walls should be built.
There was enough milk from the six cows to feed the calves, and all
the boys were getting pasteurized milk each morning at 9:00 a.m. Mikkelsen was
delighted to see the boys drinking milk, and it made him feel as if his work at the
boystown was most worthwhile. 68
While Mikkelsen was struggling to get the dairy set up, Alami made a
visit to the United States. He went to Salt Lake City, Utah where Bigler held an
open house in Alami's honor.

George Johariya, the ADS Agriculturalist and

Reem, Alami's secretary, accompanied Alami. R. H. Walker was also expecting
Clark to take Alami to the BYU campus that Monday for an informal dinner with
President Wilkinson and others he invited. R. H. Walker had invited Bigler to the
dinner and he informed Wilkinson that Alami had apparently asked Bigler
previously by letter to make arrangements for him while he was in Utah as well
as following up on obtaining Hogan.
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R. H. Walker felt that Alami had not fully understood the situation
and events which had occurred the previous fall and winter. Walker presumably
felt that Alami did not understand fully what had happened when the project
shifted gears from Bigler to BYU.

Walker wanted to clear up any possible

misunderstanding about the shift in responsibility. It was Walker's belief that
Bigler would understand without any ill feeling in the matter. Moreover, BYU
wanted to clear up the matter so BYU could work directly with Alami rather
than indirectly as their communications had been taking place. °
Alami Expresses Gratitude to President McKay
Mr. Alami also had a meeting with the First Presidency of the LDS
Church on June 27, 1961. Alami had been sick with a heart attack, but he told
those at the meeting that before he did anything else, he had to come to Utah
and pay his respects to President McKay and President Wilkinson for what they
had done. Mr. Alami made this statement:
I feel, and I am saying it in all humility and sincerity, that the
association with BYU, that the modest effort there has given us
more courage and more hope than any gift or grants which have
been made to us by either Point IV or the Ford Foundation or any
other institution in England, and I will tell you why. All these
other institutions give these grants; they may be big grants, we
have a million dollars from the Ford Foundation, we get $100,000
from Point IV, we get several hundred thousand of dollars from
several other institutions in England. They were all given as part
of their routine grants, but this gift of cattle with all that followed
it was a gift from the heart and we feel that it came with love, and
we feel that no gift and no cooperation can be effective unless it is
coupled with love. °
President McKay expressed his gratitude for Alami's sentiment and
for his pleasure that the Church and BYU had pleased him and that the cattle
had arrived safely.
A month after Alami had visited Utah he asked again if BYU would
proceed in getting a good man to install the dairy equipment and prepare the
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processing plant for operation.

He wanted someone who could stay at least a

year. The individual's transportation and salary would be paid for by the ADS.
The Ford Foundation had agreed to give the ADS help in getting this project
accomplished.

2

LDS Church Donates Beef Cattle
About the same time Alami was asking for help to install the dairy
equipment, he was asking for another donation from the LDS Church. This time
there was talk of donating some beef cattle. President Wilkinson had spoken to
President David O. McKay about the Church contributing some beef cattle.
President McKay suggested that Wilkinson call Leo Ellsworth, manager of the
LDS Florida cattle ranch to find out his suggestions.

He told him that the

Florida ranch could spare twenty to twenty-five heifers and a bull. Ellsworth
said that this would only be a drop in a bucket. He recommended sending the
Santa Gertrudis breed which is a cross between the Brahman and the Durham.
He felt this breed would do much better in the Jordan climate. Wilkinson wanted
a quick reply from President McKay if he was in favor of such a donation in
order that Wilkinson could get in touch with Alami to arrange for the cattle to
70

be delivered to a boat sailing from Florida the first part of September.' °
Mikkelsen's opinion about the feasibility of developing a small herd of
beef cattle at the boystown was favorable. Mikkelsen was in favor of things that
would enhance the educational program for the boys, but he was not interested in
a large commercial project. He also felt that Alami only needed two men rather
than the three that Alami had asked for. He felt a tropical fruit man and a farm
mechanic were all that were needed, Mikkelsen mentioned that there was a lot
of machinery at the school that was not being used for want of repairs.
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Another month passed and Wilkinson still did not know whom they
could send to set up the dairy equipment. Wilkinson did not feel Hogan was the
best man because of his poor health and he wanted to find a man in better
health. 7 4
On August 16, President Wilkinson received his answer from President
McKay concerning the beef cattle donation to the boystown. The LDS Church
leaders were in favor of the matter and President Moyle of the LDS Church First
Presidency had called Ellsworth in Florida and asked him to make the necessary
arrangements for shipping the beef cattle. Wilkinson was authorized to proceed
with the project and he was to prepare a full report for the First Presidency
concerning the number of cattle to be shipped and when they would be shipped. 75
The cattle were to be shipped by the World Friendship Organization
under the leadership of Dr. W. O. Parr of Paduca, Kentucky. The cattle were to
go as part of a large shipload of gifts to Jerusalem. Parr was about to obtain the
funds to deliver the cattle to the ADS in Jordan. 7 6

Arrangements were also

being made to ship the remaining necessary supplies and spare parts for the dairy
plant on the World Friendship ship. The supplies were paid for by funds deposited
77

in the Davis County Bank by Alami and sent to Pensacola, Florida.
In Jericho things were being prepared for the arrival of the beef
cattle. Mikkelsen mentioned that Alami was disappointed that Parr would not be
shipping some Jersey cattle and sheep along with the beef cattle. Mikkelsen felt
that it was a good thing because there was not enough feed available on the
boystown farm at that time.

Mikkelsen, moreover, expressed optimism and

enthusiasm about setting up the milking and processing equipment with the aid of
local mechanics. Therefore, R. H. Walker said that they were giving up the idea
of sending a special dairy mechanic to Jericho.
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President Wilkinson had also been informed by a letter from David H.
Hawkins, assistant manager of Deseret Farms of Florida Incorporated, that
twenty head of Santa Gertrudis had been shipped to Jericho. Fifteen of them
were two year old heifers, three were three year old heifers, one was a two year
old bull and one was a four year old bull. Each animal had an individual number
firebranded on the right hind quarter.

Each heifer had been bred to an Angus

bull to facilitate less difficulty in calving since Angus calves are smaller boned
at birth. 7 8
In early January 1962, Alami informed Wilkinson that the beef cattle
had arrived. The cattle were enroute for 52 days and one of the heifers had died
for some unknown reason. One year had elapsed since Mikkelsen and Bigler had
been in Holland and Mikkelsen was still struggling to set up the milking parlor
and processing plant. Mikkelsen was wishing again that Hogan could be with him
to help set up the equipment.

Mikkelsen was happy with the rapid gains the

Santa Gertrudis were making and he mentioned that there were now fifty-five
head of cattle at the farm. 7 9
The Mikkelsen-Alami Conflict
Another personality conflict was that of Seymour Mikkelsen and Musa
Alami. Once in Jericho, Mikkelsen came to realize that Alami was not much
support. It was Alami's project, his boystown, and he had full control of what
was to be done.

If Alami did not agree with a proposal or plan, it was not

implemented. Mikkelsen had a hard time getting things done and was never able
to set up the milk processing equipment nor the milking parlor. Alami did not
have much confidence in him. Part of Alami's lack of confidence in Mikkelsen, if
the whole truth were known, may have extended from some ideas Bigler related
to Alami by letter about Mikkelsen's own doubts of being able to set up the
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equipment. Bigler was still hoping at that time that he and Hogan would go over
to Jericho first and get the project underway.
The incompatibility of Alami and Mikkelsen had begun before
Mikkelsen ever reached the project.

Mikkelsen had not been prepared to deal

with Alami's way of thinking and doing things.

Alami had a feudal landlord

mentality and Mikkelsen had assumed he would be free to go about the task of
setting up the dairy as he saw fit.

Wilkinson had not been aware of the true

circumstances in which Mikkelsen was immersed.

Moreover, Wilkinson did not

know enough about Alami's disposition.
The working conditions and efficiency methods in Jericho were not
what Mikkelsen was used to in the United States.

He had many frustrating

moments in trying to construct the building for the milking and processing
equipment. Alami knew very little about the milking parlor and the processing
equipment. Therefore, he did not understand the problems involved and he did
not seem to be very cooperative in getting the materials, help, and equipment on
site as they were needed. This human factor was detrimental in that sufficient
support and understanding was not provided to Mikkelsen. The indirect reports
Wilkinson was receiving about the Mikkelsens was also detrimental.
Hugh Walker's letter to Wilkinson of November 1961 is another
example of indirect communication.

Hugh Walker of the Ford Foundation in

Beirut, Lebanon wrote to Wilkinson concerning the Mikkelsens. He did not give
much detail but he felt that the Mikkelsens should be returned to the United
States immediately. He understood that many things had gone wrong and Alami
would have to explain later if he would. Hugh Walker had received reports from
several people. One such person was an American who had just stopped by for a
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short visit. He reported that all he heard were complaints. The Mikkelsens had
been strongly supporting some of the people at the project according to H.
Walker and it was these same people that H. Walker was trying to convince
Alami he should dismiss from the project.
Moreover, H. Walker related that Jericho was a tough place to live
and especially for women.

He said he was sorry that the Mikkelsens had not

enjoyed Jericho and he felt that his health had been a factor.

Hugh Walker

suggested that Wilkinson write to Alami for the details. However, H. Walker
said that Alami would not take the initiative to write and explain the problem.
Alami was just too kind hearted to do this and that was what got him constantly
in trouble.

Alami was afraid of hurting people's feelings but Walker said the

situation just could not go on much longer.
A few days later, November 24, 1961, Wilkinson wrote a memorandum
to R. H. Walker asking him to read a recent letter from Mikkelsen and evidently
things were progressing well on the dairy project in Jericho. Wilkinson felt that
Mikkelsen would do a good job if Alami would not become too impatient.
Bigler

also

received

some

negative

information

about

the

Mikkelsens. Norman Burns had related that Reverend Hopkins had stopped by to
see him and told him on a confidential basis that the Mikkelsens had become
difficult to work with at the boystown. Reverend Hopkins stated that Mikkelsen
was very good in the dairy end of the project, but he was delving into politics
that was getting him into trouble. Reverend Hopkins had said that Mikkelsen had
told the boys that they were slave labor and they should strike to get a wage or
some sort of better financial benefits above their board and training. So the
boys struck. The Jordanian staff kept it a secret from Alami for a few days, but
eventually some of the boys were dismissed and Mikkelsen was told not to
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concern himself with politics. In addition, Reverend Hopkins had understood that
Mrs. Mikkelsen had gathered the Christian boys about her and expressed her
feelings that they were mistreated or of a lesser importance than the Muslim
boys. Reverend Hopkins said that Alami had the whole situation ironed out and
it was for the best interest of the project that Mikkelsen confine himself to his
own specialization. The political problems in the Arab world are too complex for
outsiders to become involved in without getting into a lot of trouble. It was
inappropriate for Reverend Hopkins to be the one to give a negative report on
the project. Alami should have immediately reported to Wilkinson concerning
problems on the project.
In spite of this, Mikkelsen continued to write as if nothing were
wrong.

He never mentioned the incidents spoken of by H. Walker or Burns.

Mikkelsen merely explained that he had the milking stalls in and then stopped
because the processing plant was not completed enough to install the bulk milk
tank. He was optimistic about a brighter future and expressed that when the
project was completed it would be the best set up he had ever been privileged to
89

operate 0 *

In addition, President Wilkinson mentioned that R. H. Walker had

written to Alami concerning Mikkelsen's activity. R. H. Walker never received a
reply; therefore, Wilkinson admonished Alami to answer him honestly and
oq

fully.

Alami did not reply to this request. However, Alami wrote and stated

that some dairy processing equipment had been shipped along with the beef
cattle but there was some question as to whether it had arrived. Dr. Parr, who
was responsible for the ship and its contents, had no explanation to make, and
84

Alami stated that Dr. Parr was a great disappointment to him. *
H. Walker had received a copy of the letter Alami had sent to
Wilkinson.

The boxes of dairy equipment were checked and apparently

4S
everything had been received.

Moreover, R. H. Walker stated that it was

apparently not uncommon for Alami to become upset and he felt that maybe this
was the cause of the difficulty to which H. Walker had referred to in his letter
about the Mikkelsens. 85

With the different sources of information, Wilkinson
8R

was in a dilemma as to what to say in a reply to Alami's latest letter. 0 0
R. H. Walker was asked by Wilkinson to draft a letter which he felt
Wilkinson should send to Alami. They sent a pleasant assuring letter. Among
other things it mentioned the hope of the project to continue developing and that
the dairy and beef cattle would help give the boys the necessary training that
Alami desired for them as well as to serve as the precursor of a good livestock
industry for Jordan. The letter expressed that this type of project would make a
great contribution to the welfare of the Arab people and Wilkinson and R. H.
Walker were happy that BYU was able to participate in its development.
Meanwhile, Mikkelsen stated in a letter that he felt that Alami was
seeing the need for a little advice on the dairy project. Alami seemed to have
changed his attitude drastically about suggestions presented to him. Mikkelsen
had been fearful for some time that his efforts for a workable relationship would
be for nothing but he felt that his patience had been rewarded.
Mikkelsen at least knew what his task was and there was no problem
as to having efforts duplicated because no one there, including Alami, knew how
to properly construct the buildings for the dairy processing equipment. However,
no one was appropriately asking about or listening to Mikkelsen's problems.
Just as the dairy project seemed to be developing satisfactorily, some
more adverse events occurred. Reverend Hopkins, at a conference in Salt Lake
City, spoke again of Alami's problems with the Mikkelsens. Hopkins urged BYU
to alert Mikkelsen and have him get ready to return to BYU. Wilkinson wanted
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to wait until Alami was in the United States to discuss the matter before making
any decision. Hopkins stated to Wilkinson that Alami's official message was that
Mikkelsen should be invited to return home before the hot summer season
because of his health. Hopkins admitted that this was merely a diplomatic way
of asking Mikkelsen to leave the project. 87
R. H. Walker had heard the same story from Hopkins two days prior to
when Wilkinson was informed.

Walker suggested that BYU concede to Alami's

wish and bring the Mikkelsens home. However, he suggested that Alami continue
Mikkelsen's salary until the end of August, yet allow Mikkelsen to leave earlier if
the heat became too much for him. This would protect Mikkelsen financially. 88
Wilkinson asked in the letter if they could send any information or
suggestions to Mikkelsen that would be helpful in his assignment. He mentioned
again that they did not seem to have had a reply to the inquiry about the services
of Mikkelsen. Wilkinson told Alami that he would appreciate a response from
him. 89 Alami's reply to Wilkinson was that he would agree to any suggestion
that Wilkinson would offer at any time. That was because, as Alami stated, he
had been such a friend and supporter of the ADS and of Alami himself. 90
Wilkinson and R. H. Walker were sure that there were two sides to the
problems Mikkelsen was having at the boystown and felt that Mikkelsen had done
a good job looking after the cattle. This had been one of the major concerns
before the dairy project was entered into by BYU. It was necessary to have
someone supervise the cattle while they were adapting to the new climate and
feed, and while the personnel at the school were learning how to care for the
cattle. Regret was expressed by R. H. Walker that Mikkelsen was unable to set
up the dairy equipment. There were several presumptions as to the delay but the
equipment still needed to be installed and operated.

R. H. Walker was sure
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Mikkelsen could have done this if Alami would have given him the proper
support. 91 Up to this time R. H. Walker and Wilkinson still did not understand
why the equipment had not been set up, but they never inquired of Mikkelsen to
find out. They were relying on Alami.
In desperation R. H. Walker admonished Alami once again to answer
honestly and fully concerning Mikkelsen's activities and finally Alami responded
by telling R. H. Walker that he had installed an air conditioner in Mikkelsen's
house and this had caused jealousy problems with the others. Even Alami did not
have one because he did not want to receive any special treatment more than the
others.

He also stated that Mikkelsen had become isolated and did not

communicate with the others. Alami certainly could be blamed for some of this
behavior.

Alami did not cooperate with him and the personnel would have

followed Alami's lead in this type of behavior at Alami's request or by his
example. Alami supressed the channels of communications at will. He exacted a
great deal of power over the project.
According to Alami, Mikkelsen had admitted to telling the five or six
boys working with him that they should be paid. In addition, Alami did not feel
Mikkelsen was competent to install the dairy equipment. He had attempted to
install the central milking equipment but had to change it two or three times.
Therefore, Alami did not let him install the other equipment. Alami also stated
that he did not need the equipment at that time because of the low milk
production. Even after stating these situations, Alami suggested that Mikkelsen
could complete his term at the boystown but R. H. Walker felt that it would be
better if Mikkelsen returned immediately with pay until September.
no

agreed to this. *

Alami
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Consequently, Wilkinson wrote to Mikkelsen stating that even though
he had committed to stay at the boystown until January of 1963, it would be
better for BYU if he would return and report for duty on the first of
September. Wilkinson had told Mikkelsen that Alami had suggested that he stay
until January but he had graciously consented to his return in the summer.
Wilkinson stated that Mikkelsen's health was a concern because he had
learned of his bout with hepatitis and his heart attacks. Therefore, it had been
arranged with Alami to compensate Mikkelsen until September by the ADS with
the understanding that he could leave Jericho at any time in order to take full
advantage of a vacation before arriving home for work in September. 93 Even
Wilkinson was not being totally honest with Mikkelsen. He did not tell him of the
indirect reports he received about Mikkelsen at the boystown nor did he ask
Mikkelsen for opinion or explanation. He never told him the real reason why he
was asked to report back to BYU six months early. Overall, Mikkelsen became
the scapegoat for Alami's poor management practices and lack of knowledge of
properly planning and setting up the dairy project.

Alami's poor management

practices were a concern to others such as Burns and McCowan of USAID.
Norman Burns had left the AID program in Jordan and became the
President of the American University at Beirut by May 1962. He had expressed
concern about Alami's managerial abilities with the project and funds. He felt
Alami was a man of high integrity, but that his business procedures were
sloppy. Dr. Burns stated that the greatest favor to Alami would be to loan him a
person to improve the management of the project. There were those like Fareed
Imam that implied that Alami was living off the fat of the land. Alami was, in
fact, very opposed to having an auditor do a thorough study of his records. A
good business manager was needed at the ADS school to reduce the careless
methods followed in the entire operation.

52
The Ford Foundation's relationship with Alami had been very good.
They felt that Alami was one of the greatest men in the Middle East and they
had much faith in his project. But even the Ford Foundation could see that more
than new technology, Alami needed better business management.
President Burns mentioned that Alami had set up an advisory board of
three members. Burns thought that the board needed to be strengthened and it
should be encouraged to make decisions and be part of the policy development
instead of leaving full power in the hands of one man.

This was especially

important, since Alami's health had not been very good in the past years. A
board was needed that could function when Alami was not present at the ADS
school and would add to more continuity when Alami became unable to function
in his duties.
R. H. Walker had talked with Dr. Monroe McCowan, Chief of the
Agricultural Branch for the Near East and South East Asia Bureau in the United
States, Agency for International Development (AID) in Washington, D.C. and his
assistant, Don Shallow. Walker's purpose was to obtain information about the
AID-ADS relationship. The working relationship between the AID and the ADS
had been handled by the Educational Branch in AID.

During Walker's

conversation with McCowan he learned some ideas which seemed to reflect AID'S
attitude toward the ADS school.

McCowan was not sure what Alami was

teaching the boys, he did not know what kind of organized program Alami was
running nor if the boys would be properly trained to find jobs when they
graduated.

McCowan seemed to feel that something was lacking in the boys'

curriculum and training.
graduates. 9 5

Also, there was no placement program for the
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McCowan suggested in June 1962 that BYU make a thorough study of
the ADS if it contemplated any additional help to the ADS. The study ought to
encompass the educational objectives and procedures as well as the management
and operations.

This study should have been undertaken before BYU became

involved. Even the Ford Foundation and USAID should have studied the Alami
boystown more carefully.
In addition, the AID was then conducting an audit of the business
operations.

Meanwhile, Garland Hopkins, then the Secretary General of the

World Fellowship of Moslems and Christians and contributor to the Alami
Foundation in New York, had called R. H. Walker wanting to know if the LDS
Church was planning any additional help to the ADS. It was evident that Hopkins
had not been successful in obtaining other help for the ADS; therefore, they were
looking to the LDS Church as a promising prospect for support.
Walker asked Hopkins if Alami would favor BYU sending a faculty
member to the ADS to study the curriculum and management of the school.
Hopkins replied that it would be favorable if BYU just studied how it would
better relate to the support of the project. However, to study the management
and operations of the ADS school would not be approved. Hopkins stated that
AID had made a survey in the fall of 1961 and reported that the ADS school was
more successful than its own AID supported school. 96

The ADS was Alami's

show and he would run it his way. All he wanted was the funds to do so without
any strings attached.

Alami was not the only one with management problems,

Wilkinson did not use enough resources to learn the details of Mikkelsen's
problems at the ADS. A better support and communication system for Mikkelsen
was needed but never implemented.
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Mikkelsen's Advocate
Mikkelsen was having a trying time at the boystown. Hugh Walker
and Garland Hopkins had been sending Wilkinson some adverse reports about the
Mikkelsens, but Mikkelsen also had a seemingly unbiased advocate—a news
columnist for the Chicago Tribune named Tom Dammann. Mr. Dammann and his
wife had gone to Aqaba to greet Dr Parr's "Friend Ship," It was there that
Dammann met Mikkelsen and arrangements were made for Dammann to go to
the boystown near Jericho for photographs to be used in conjunction with an
article he was working on concerning contributions such as the beef cattle to
Jordan,

He went to Jericho taking the two Future Farmers who had

accompanied and cared for the cattle across the Atlantic and Mediterranean.
Mr. Dammann introduced himself to Alami, but was told he did not
have time to talk to him in a most insulting manner. Dammann explained that he
was an American newspaper correspondent anxious to tell the story of American
help to Alami's countrymen.

Alami was quoted as saying in an explosive way,

"You can take it all back home with you right now." 97 as he waved his hand
toward the truckload of tools and equipment.
Dammann later learned from others that Alami would frequently
express himself in irrational outbursts. However, since he was doing such a great
work for his people, he refrained from printing this happpening in his article.
Instead, he related this incident to R. H. Walker as a testimony that the
Mikkelsens were under very trying psychological conditions. He continued by
stating that this fact could be confirmed with the American Consulate in
Jerusalem, and that the Mikkelsens' patience, understanding, and dedication
which they displayed each day, was something all Americans would be proud
of. 98° This adverse information about Alami was related to Wilkinson, who
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expressed no objection to R. H. Walker's sending a copy of Dammann's letter to
Hugh Walker in Beirut for his reply on Dammann's comments about Alami.
From Mikkelsen's perspective, things were going pretty well in
February, 1962. There was no real rush to get the parlor and processing plant set
no

up since there were only thirteen cows producing.

This small number of cows

would not produce enough milk to warrant operating the large expensive milking
parlor, nor would the small volume of milk be sufficient to even start up any
processing equipment. Between the baby calves and the boys, the fresh milk was
readily consumed.
Mikkelsen's Return to Provo
Wilkinson had expressed his deight to Mikkelsen that BYU had been
instrumental in establishing an outstanding herd of cattle for the ADS, even
though the dairy equipment did not get installed.

The Mikkelsens returned to

Provo, Utah the latter part of July.
Even before Mikkelsens return to BYU, Wilkinson wrote to Alami
inquiring if BYU should attempt to locate a man to take Mikkelsen's place. 1 0
Ten days later, Walker received a call from Frederick Thomas of the Ford
Foundation stating that Alami had called asking them to send someone to set up
the dairy equipment.

Mr. Thomas was just checking to find out if Alami had

made any conflicting arrangements with BYU before he would proceed in trying
to find someone for the job. 1 0 2

This was an intelligent move. Evidently Mr.

Thomas knew Alami well enough to know that he asks everyone for the same
thing and persists until someone supplies what he asks for.
Wilkinson raised the issue that the equipment deal was actually set up
through Bigler and BYU was not directly responsible except that at one time,
when Alami was in Provo, BYU did offer to help get someone to set up the dairy
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machinery. Therefore, Wilkinson still wanted to help get the processing plant
operational. 103
Smoot Hired to Set Up the Dairy Machinery at ADS
Finally, after months of trying to locate a suitable person to send
over to the ADS to set up the equipment, Neldon Smoot, who operated a small
farm similar to the ADS with his father in Centerville, Utah, was selected. 1 0 4
Wilkinson was happy to find out that the Ford Foundation had assumed the
financial obligations for the work. He assured Alami that BYU and the General
Authorities of the LDS Church had a deep interest in the work which was being
done by the ADS and they were very anxious to see the school grow and develop
in order to continue serving the young boys of Jordan and other areas in the
Middle East. They had confidence that the program of training would do a great
deal toward the development of the young men and their eventual contribution to
the welfare of the Arab people. 1 0 5 Alami replied to Wilkinson's letter stating
that he would never forget his personal enthusiasm and interest in the project
and the warm support of President McKay. Without them there would not have
been a dairy farm in the Jordan Valley. Alami said he would be forever grateful
to all involved in bringing the project to fruition. 106
The Smoots arrived January 1963 in Beirut. Hugh Walker of the Ford
Foundation had told Neldon that it was his job to get the dairy plant operating so
Alami could market the products in Jerusalem and Amman and eventually make
the project self-sustaining. He went to Jericho with that intent.
Mr. Smoot stated that the school was one of the most terrific things
he had seen.

1 Q7

* He felt that someone had done a great job in teaching the boys

how to care for the livestock and that Johariya had done a fine job in managing
the cattle. Smoot was very complimentary to Mikkelsen, praising his work at the
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ADS even though he did very little with the equipment.

Mikkelsen was also

highly respected by Johariya and the boys. He related that the cows were in
excellent shape, the breeding program was fine, there was plenty of good hay,
and excellent grain ration. The milk production was good, and the calves were
healthy and growing well. They had just begun using a fine bull that was born
just when the cows had arrived at the ADS. A good disease prevention program
had been followed, especially for hoof and mouth disease. Smoot had started
immediately to uncrate and inventory the equipment with the help of the boys.
Everything seemed to be there with a couple of minor problems, but he was
confident that they could be worked out. He was excited about the fine building
that had been built to house the equipment. Smoot felt that the plant would "be
one of the finest and most up to date plants in the world of its size" 1 0

after

they got the equipment installed. He told R. H. Walker that he could be proud of
his part in the project and that the efforts of the LDS Church were greatly
appreciated by the Arab people. Bigler received a letter from Smoot praising
him for the excellent job he had done in obtaining such fine equipment. Smoot
noted that the dairy plant building was of white tile with a beautiful marble
floor. He was sure he could have the plant operating within two months and he
was enjoying working with the boys who already were calling him uncle. 1 1 0
Everything went well for a month or two, but then it began to be clear to Smoot
that Alami did not care if the project was self-sustaining.
In mid-March, 1963, Alami wrote telling Wilkinson that he was very
happy with the Smoots and that the equipment would take at least eight to ten
weeks more before the processing plant would be in full operation because of
small things missing and because some of the electric motors were not wired
properly for the electrical power system in Jericho. He also stated that the

58
Santa Gertrudis were not doing well and they were costly to raise. Smoot and
other dairy experts, British and Arab, recommended that they sell the beef
cattle and buy Holsteins.
Lola Smoot, wife of the late Nelson Smoot, stated that her husband
had a hard time getting anything done. The Arab workers were independent and
did things the way they wanted to. The process of getting anything done was
very slow compared to the way he was used to working. When Smoot wanted to
get something done he would go to Reem Hamameh, Alami's secretary and right
hand person.

Reem knew relatively everything and was very helpful to

Smoot. 1 1 2
Hugh Walker of the Ford Foundation had not been very helpful to
Smoot.

He always sided with Alami.

This was a detriment to Smoot and

hampered his ability to achieve the goal Hugh Walker had given him when Smoot
arrived in Beirut. The milking parlor and processing plant was a million dollar
show place, but it was not practical to Smoot. The project was one to get money
and H. Walker would play into Alami's hands for it the best he could. Alami and
Hugh Walker both had their motives, but it was hard for Smoot to understand
why so much money was wasted. The fact that the boys were not working much
and were only attending their classes bothered Smoot. He felt the boys could
learn to do more work and save the boystown a lot of money rather than hire
other Arabs to do the work. 1 1 3
Hugh Walker was a loyal supporter of Alami's project and Alami
gathered support from all who would give.

This made the control of the

management at the ADS very difficult. Because Hugh Walker had never lived at
the project for a long period, he was not in a position to understand the problems
and could not make clear decisions regarding it.
Alami's lead and requests.

Instead he merely followed
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It was reported that the calves born and raised on the ADS farm were
in demand in Jordan and other parts of the Arab World. The ADS was selling as
many as they could spare at a moderate price and there was much room for
expanding the dairy operation. 1 1 4 Selling the heifer calves when Alami needed
more cows to build an economical unit to run the milking parlor and processing
plant at its completion made little sense. Alami would sell the calves and at the
same time be pleading for more donations of cows and/or money.
The facts that the project was incomplete and not self-supporting
were used as excuses for
organizations.

Alami to raise

more funds

from

different

One day George Johariya, the farm superintendent, told Alami

that Smoot had instructions to make the dairy economically stable and even
profitable.
thinking.

Alami was quoted as saying he would straighten out Smoot's
Alami argued that selling the milk was depriving the boys of milk.

Smoot stressed that there was a surplus of milk which could be sold without
jeopardizing the boys' daily consumption of milk. Alami had disagreed and from
that point on ". . . Musa did everything he could to frustrate the completion of
the dairy project." 1 1 5
Smoot felt that Alami deliberately left

some of the bottling

equipment in customs for over two months until he told Alami that he had better
cooperate with him or else he would report Alami's conduct to the Ford
Foundation.

It was only two days later that the bottling equipment had been

released and delivered to the project.

Smoot said this was typical of Alami's

conduct during the year Smoot had worked there.

"In fact," said Smoot, "I

probably never could have gotten the dairy going if it had not been for the fact
that Musa was sick from March until November, 1963, and it was during this
period that I really got the job done." 1 1 6
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Moreover, Smoot said he had noticed many times that when important
people, who could supply Alami with additional funding, visited the dairy, Alami
would arrange everything so that the project would look incomplete. Smoot gave
one example in which he returned one weekend to find that Alami had upset the
whole dairy plant. This had been after Smoot had completed the plant and had it
in operation. Another time he had unplugged the ice cream freezers, stacked
supplies from the store room on the processing room floor, and did other things
to make the plant look unfinished.

Smoot was surprised and had asked Alami

what he was doing, but Alami's only response was that he would tell him later.
As soon as the boys left who were helping Alami put things in disarray, he
informed Smoot that some important people were coming and he wanted the
place to look incomplete.
Smoot felt that Alami's attitude and conduct toward the dairy project
was also reflected in his management of the farm. Smoot had seen four acres of
lettuce left uncultivated and unweeded. Alami had made no attempt to save the
crop even though he had 160 boys who could have helped.

The lettuce crop

became a complete loss.
Termination of BYU's Involvement in the Project
When Smoot left on December 7, 1963, he was under the impression
that Alami no longer had an interest in the project except that it was a guise for
obtaining money.

Smoot could see that Alami was a poor manager.

He had

talked with Arabs and Americans who had worked with Alami and had seen his
operation. They too felt that he was wasteful in the use of funds given to him.
Smoot stopped to visit the Ford Foundation office in New York on his
way home from the ADS to tell them his story. The Ford Foundation people
seemed happy to see him and they told him that when they had sent him over to
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Jericho they really did not expect that he could get the dairy in operation. The
Ford Foundations' long experience with Alami gave them a great deal of
reservation as to whether the dairy project would ever be completed. They had
felt that the obstacles at the ADS farm were more than any man could
overcome. Smoot had related to Harvey Hall of the Ford Foundation that Alami
had given him a lot of problems but that he was determined to put the plant into
operation as he had promised.
It would seem that some personnel in the Ford Foundation were strong
supporters of Alami and the ADS but others had a different perspective. The
Ford Foundation would donate large sums of money to Alami even though they
knew he was a poor manager. They felt he was a great man but did not try to
help him improve his management practices. They seem to just get along with
him with little concern about the cost or waste. The Ford Foundation personnel
in New York did not bother to inform Smoot of the possible obstacles he would
encounter at the ADS. They let Smoot find out for himself. This is a weakness
of human nature and poor management.
In January, 1964, Smoot was in R. H. Walker's office at BYU to report
on his work at Jericho.

He stated that the dairy project was in excellent

condition and operating well. Of the original 26 head of dairy animals, two had
died and 24 were in production. When Smoot left the project on December 10,
1963, there were 26 cows producing and the total number of dairy animals was
nearly 70. During 1963, about 18 head of young bulls had been slaughtered for
meat since they were not needed in the breeding program. The meat was used by
the school. Alami had received another gift of 32 young heifers from Holland in
1963. The source was unknown to Smoot but presumably they came from funds
raised in England.
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Smoot reported that

the milk processing equipment had been

assembled and had been in operation for six months. The mechanized milking
machines had been in operation since May of 1963. The pasteurizing equipment
had been started in the summer and Smoot even made some ice cream which was
used at the school.

The bottling equipment was set up and operating by

November 1963, and the milk was being sold in Jerusalem and Amman. In effect,
then, the dairy plant was in full operation at the time Smoot left Jericho at the
end of the year.
Smoot's hope was that Alami would keep the people he trained at the
dairy so that the plant would remain in full operation and more boys could be
trained.

He added that it took several months to get the equipment operative

simply because not all of the equipment was at the project, several months
elapsed before some of the equipment arrived, especially the bottling equipment
and bottles. 1 1 7
In addition to Smoot's report, which R. H. Walker sent to President
Wilkinson, Walker stated that he was grateful for the privilege of representing
BYU and the LDS Church in the development of the dairy project and he was
very pleased with the success which it had.

Moreover, he appreciated the

contributions which had been made by Mikkelsen and Smoot. 1 1 8
BYU's direct involvement in the ADS dairy project was virtually over
when Mikkelsen returned to Provo in the summer of 1963. However, BYU was
involved in the procurement of Smoot to set up the equipment and operationalize
the plant. Therefore, BYU was indirectly involved until January 1964. The dairy
had been set up and functioning with men trained to carry on the full dairy
operation from feeding and caring for the cattle to the packaged dairy
products. One would think that the project would be set for great success and an
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extremely great asset to the ADS school. However, over the following months
and years many problems were to appear.
The major issue was the constant search for funds or donations of
cattle or equipment. Wilkinson and Bigler remained involved with the project for
years by virtue of their membership on the Advisory Board of the Musa Bey
Alami Foundation based in New York. Alami occasionally asked Bigler for more
help through the years.
In 1965, Smoot had written to Johariya, the farm superintendent, at
the ADS telling of his plans to conduct a tour to the Holy Land. He had also
written to Ronny, a young Dutchman who had worked with him on the dairy.
Johariya did not reply; however, Ronny had written explaining that everyone on
the project was told that if Smoot returned to the project he would not be
allowed to enter. This puzzled Smoot because he had felt good feelings from
everyone and even Johariya had told him he had done a good job. In addition,
Ronny stated that the Dutch government was no longer granting any money for
the project because of Ronny's report on Alami's poor management.
As Smoot continued to wonder why Alami would not allow him on the
project, he recalled a conversation he had had with Dr. Hopkins, the
representative of a Christian Church organization which had been donating
money to the project. Hopkins had talked with Smoot when he first arrived at
the project in Jericho and " . . . s t i l l under the spell of Alami's charm."-1
Smoot had asked Hopkins what would happen to the project if Alami died and
Hopkins replied, "This project would go much better." 1 2 0
Smoot said he did not have anything personally against Alami but he
had no confidence in him as a manager. He felt Alami was highly egotistical and
Smoot felt a little hurt that Alami never gave the LDS Church even a little
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credit for their part in the dairy project. Nor did he give the Ford Foundation
any credit and they had to insist that plaques be put on some of the buildings
which they had built for the school.

Alami had also been very critical of

Mikkelsen when Smoot would refer to him, and yet Smoot felt that Mikkelsen had
done a tremendous work when he had been there.
It was Smoot's contention that the project had great possibilities, but
only under new management. The project needed someone who undertood farm
management in order to properly keep the ground fertilized and producing good
crops. The water had to be pumped, and it was expensive to do so; therefore,
greater efficiency was needed to offset the cost of production. Hugh Walker of
the Ford Foundation in the Middle East had mentioned to Smoot that the Jericho
Valley could put a million dollars worth of fresh strawberries on the European
market at Christmastime if the area could be properly developed. 191x
The people working for Alami agreed that he was a charming and
persuasive person.

The complaints about him were his tactics and the poor

methods he used in management.

Mikkelsen and Smoot had complained that

Alami had constantly tried to frustrate their work towards completion of the
processing plant. They both agreed that Alami would dress up the project when
he wanted to impress others with his accomplishments and then turn right around
and undress it and make it look unfinished when he wanted to impress the people
who would sympathize with him and grant him more money or give their support
in obtaining more grants.
Personal conversations with Amer Salti, Shahadeh Dajani, both past
managers for the ADS farm., Wahib Tarazi, (veternarian); Mikkelsen and Lola
Smoot indicated that Alami was hard to work with. Everything had to be done
his way without exception. Salti had no freedom to use his own ingenuity as the
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manager over all operations.

He felt Alami's methods of management were

archaic and after three months decided to leave his management position for the
sake of their friendship. Tarazi, likewise, had problems in working with Alami to
improve the dairy herd, the milk production, and the butter fat content. Dajani,
also felt that Alami was good at getting money but not in making money. This
implied that Alami's charm and diplomacy aided him in getting funds but the
management of the money and the farms were poor.
Misgivings and Discrepancies in Reports
During the two years that BYU was directly involved in setting up the
dairy project there were no apparent misgivings about the project. However, a
few years later some discrepanices in reports came to Wilkinson's attention
concerning problems which Mikkelsen and Smoot had had with Alami and his
management of the boystown. Wilkinson asked Cleon Skousen, who was a faculty
member at BYU and had visited the ADS boystown on at least two different
occasions and had reported to Wilkinson on his findings in late 1966, to review
Wilkinson's ADS files and report his finding. His reports came from the Alami
Foundation in New York, from Alami himself, and from the Ford Foundation. All
these people were very supportive of the ADS dairy project and were constantly
reporting optimistic facts to bolster more interest and/or for fund raising
purposes as is the case of the Alami Foundation and Alami himself. The reports
were biased and represented a skewed view of the ADS project.
Skousen spoke with Mikkelsen and Smoot and found that they had
many problems at the ADS boystown which were never reported to Wilkinson.
Like Skousen, they were hesitant to report anything negative about Wilkinson's
"BYU-ADS" dairy project. Wilkinson only asked for the positive aspects of their
experience. He seemed to set the tone for what information was expected and
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Mikkelsen, Smoot and Skousen seemingly wanted to please Wilkinson with the
correct replies.

Wilkinson evidently intimidated the people he was associated

with.
W. Cleon Skousen had been at the ADS project in October of 1966 and
had been requested to furnish President McKay and his counselors with a report
of his findings.

A source of Skousen's information came from Fareed Imam, a

friend of King Hussein of Jordan. Imam handled most of the official tours of
Jordan for the king.
Skousen had visited the Holy Land for the first time in 1962 and had
seen the farm and dairy project which Alami had been developing. It was said to
have been a great and growing operation. At that time he mentioned that some
of the Mormons were helping to supervise the project and he was greatly
impressed by the entire project.
On other trips to the Holy Land, Skousen had asked Imam to take his
tourist groups, which he was directing, to the Alami project, but Imam refused.
In October of 1966 Skousen insisted that Imam take his group to the ADS dairy
and after much argument Imam said that he wanted to avoid the project because
it was then poorly managed. However, he took them to see the dairy project.
At this time, the project was quiet and not many people were
around.

One of the workers near the dairy had gone to announce the group's

arrival to Alami but the individual returned and stated that Alami was not
there. Skousen and Imam then walked back towards the pens and sheds which
were practically empty. Imam talked in Arabic to one of the Arabs who was
1 99

working there and he reported that many of the cows had died of disease. **
Skousen and Imam had started back toward the bus when Alami
unexpectedly came out of his house.

Evidently he was embarrassed to find
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anyone still there.

Imam talked with Alami in Arabic.

They became rather

excited and later Imam related to Skousen that Alami had given him a severe
tongue lashing.

Imam had also related to Skousen that Alami was not honest

with President McKay.
He has exploited this project to his own advantage. He hurts
the image of the people of Jordan. I am glad President McKay and
the Church are no longer giving him any help. He has been putting
a lot of money in his own pocket.
Now you know why I was
ashamed to take you to the project.
Wilkinson was irritated that Skousen had not told him this information
in October of 1966 since he ". . . was the one responsible for the Church helping
Alami in the first place, I would have thought that out of courtesy you would
have told me about it." 1 2 4

The information that Wilkinson was getting from

Skousen was at variance with all the other reports he had received. In addition,
Wilkinson received a letter from Smoot telling of his difficulties with Alami.
Wilkinson did not know what to do about this new contrast in the recent reports
he had received.

He was still awaiting Skousen's evaluation of a letter from

Kennett Love, a member of the Alami Foundation in New York who had written
a report on his trip to the ADS. 1 2 5 The letter Smoot had sent to Wilkinson was
in reply to Wilkinson's desire to get to the bottom of the discrepancy in opinions
and facts about the Alami project. Smoot said he had wanted to talk to someone
about the situation for sometime because when he returned he was asked to
report on his "accomplishments" and he never was able to express the "problems"
he had encountered.
Smoot concluded in his written report that his comments were not
intended to discourage further help by the LDS Church of the development of the
region.

His major concern was that the funds be used efficiently for good

purposes and not wasted as he felt it had been to some extent in the past. Smoot
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related to Wilkinson that he knew many other details that he could share if
Wilkinson wanted additional information.

Smoot reiterated that when he
1 nc

returned from Jericho he was asked to give just a short report. 1
Wilkinson wrote to Smoot, thanking him for his additional information
but expressing regret that the difficulties with Alami had not been reported
sooner.

Wilkinson acknowledged that Smoot's letter helped him know how to

proceed with further activity.

Moreover, Wilkinson said that most of his and

BYU's dealings had been with Bigler, who had always been enthusiastic about
Alami, and he asked whether Smoot knew of any reason why Bigler continued to
be so enthusiastic. 127
On February 7, 1968, Cleon Skousen reported by letter to Wilkinson
concerning the material he had sent him on the ADS. Skousen commented that
the reports Wilkinson had given him had been very positive and enthusiastic
about the project under Alami's management.

He, therefore, understood

Wilkinson's surprise with Skousen's report. It was apparent to Skousen that the
reports coming from the ADS were based on what people had been told by Alami
and his close assistants. The information which the reporters recorded was only
that which was given to them at the time of their visit to the ADS and not their
own personal knowledge. That was true especially in the case of Kennett Love.
Again, it was apparent to Skousen that Love quoted statistics which also
appeared in the yearly ADS report for 1967. Smoot had stated to Skousen that
the statistics were highly suspect. An example Smoot gave was that the 1967
report gave the ADS credit for providing the help and experience which
culminated in the reclamation of 50,000 acres in the Jordan Valley. However,
Alami had been very jealous of his ADS operation and had refused to share any
information or experience with other Arabs in the area.

In addition, Smoot
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related that in 1963 the total acreage that had been brought under cultivation by
well water was only 4,600 acres and he doubted that much more had been
developed since.
In 1967 the ADS yearly report and Love's report stated that there
were 430 and 450 cows respectively and 12,000 chickens before the 1967 war.
Smoot stated that this was literally impossible because the project did not even
have the facilities to handle that many livestock. Even the claim that the annual
report made concerning the sale of produce before the 1967 war was not
accepted by Smoot. He felt the $140,000 figure was grossly exaggerated. When
Smoot was operating the dairy at its peak just before he left the project, he said
that Alami would not allow the project to make $25,000 from the sale of all the
produce even though he could have done so.

Smoot stated that Alami had

consistently kept the farm dependent on outside funds.

Mikkelsen added that

while he was there, Alami had ploughed up a whole crop of truck gardening and
justified it by saying that it was necessary because of the loss of markets. Even
some of the employees became very angry. They felt that Alami could have
made the produce available to the refugees even if he did not want the crop
harvested and sold on the market. Mikkelson then proceeded to explain that as
soon as the crops were ploughed under Alami immediately set out to raise more
funds stating that a loss of crops necessitated increased funds to keep the
project alive. This resulted in the resignation of one of the foremen.
Alami had visited Utah in March of 1966, and while there Smoot had
spoken with him. Alami had told him that the Ford Foundation had stopped all
grants to the ADS project. The Ford Foundation, however, in the fall of 1966,
according to the 1967 ADS report, donated $430,000 earmarked for the dairy.
These funds were allocated at about the same time Skousen was at the dairy.
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Skousen pointed out that the 1967 report claimed that the 1967 war
had greatly damaged the project and that it would take three years to rebuild
it. The Love report of December 1967 stated that the damage of the war could
no longer be detected even by himself who had been acquainted with the farm
for fifteen

years.

It was Smoot's opinion that the claimed losses and

destruction had never really occurred. The 1967 ADS report of having 430 cows
and Love's report of 450 cows, according to Smoot, was misleading and not made
in good faith. 1 2 8
With this new variant information, Wilkinson asked his administrative
assistant,

Dean

A.

Peterson,

to

study

through

all

the

material

and

correspondence Wilkinson had about the ADS and prepare a summary of his
findings. Wilkinson had also been asked by Alvin R. Dyer, representing the First
Presidency of the LDS Church, to give a full report on the matter. Wilkinson
stated that he would resign from Alami's Advisory Committee if anything was
1 9Q

found that proved things were not as Alami had said they were.

1 y

Peterson did not come up with any new profound insights; he merely
summarized the data and ideas contained in the letters and reports given to him
by Wilkinson. He did, however, talk with R. H. Walker and Amer Salti, an orphan
from the ADS, about the project and Walker indicated that the project was a
great humanitarian attempt even though the project was falling far short of its
potential.
Nothing was found which stated that Wilkinson resigned from Alami's
advisory committee but research in Israel revealed even greater discrepancies
than those mentioned by Skousen and Smoot. Alami's post 1967 war report on
the "Present and Future of the ADS" stated that the farm suffered most, for
several days the cows and chickens went almost entirely without food and water
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and there was no veterinary care available. As a result, according to Alami,
about 60 percent of the cows and poultry either died or had to be slaughtered.
Out of 430 cows only 170 remained and of the 12,000 chickens only 4,000
survived. All of the remaining cows and chickens were in pretty bad shape and
needed to be replaced as soon as possible.
The alfalfa fields had been left without irrigation for six weeks and
only 20 percent of the fields survived, leaving only 40 acres of the 200 acres that
were still producing.
Alami stated that only two of the sixteen wells were operating after
the war. The pumps and engines were destroyed or damaged and the trucks and
tractors were either stolen or damaged.

The electric generator broke down

allowing the products in cold storage to spoil which was a loss of several
thousand pounds sterling. The dairy plant was damaged and inoperable. i ^nu
Alami had not even been at the boystown during the 1967 war. He
was out of the country and was unable to return. Moreover, Tawfiq Hussain, an
instructor at the ADS, in a newspaper article dated July 24, 1967, was quoted as
making a statement very contrary to what Aalmi had stated about the farm
destruction.

Hussain had said, after the 1967 war "The Israel Army was most

cooperative. The soldiers helped us in the first hard days of the war, and no
damage whatsoever was done. There were 300 head of cattle and a huge poultry
run." He complained, however, of the difficulties of marketing their products
and the farm manager had stated that "During the six days war, the farm had
been unseratched . . . " 1 3 2
Sir Geoffrey Furlonge, the former British Ambassador to Amman and
author of "Palestine is My Country—the story of Musa Alami" had stated that
"all vehicles had been taken and many of the houses looted" during the 1967 war

72
but Mr. Salah had refuted this in a newspaper article dated May 30, 1969. He
also denied the allegation that he had

' " . . wrestled with local Israeli

officialdom to obtain necessary permits,' and that 'Israeli tanks had put all but
two wells of the farm out of order.'" 1 3 3
In an interview with Mr. Salah in Jericho, Israel (West Bank) 1983, he
stated that Alami was upset with him for having kept the farm in such a fine
state after the 1967 war.

This is understandable if Alami was spreading

propaganda of the devastation during the 1967 war.

One could surmise that

Alami was seeking sympathy for fundraising purposes.
If these statements by Tawfiq and Salah are true then a conference
held by the ADS in Jerusalem in April of 1973 for the purpose of appealing to the
Israeli authorities to repair and replace the damages and losses which occurred
to the ADS in the six days war was a farce. The conference had been attended
by United States and British supporters of the ADS. 1 3 4
There were many other reports on the number of cows at the
boystown dairy which were highly suspect. Over the years the number of head
seemed to become more exaggerated.

The discrepancies learned by Wilkinson

and those discovered since tends to leave one with many misgivings as to the
intent of Alami and others by printing many so called facts with such frequency
and magnitude of discrepancy.

CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF THE STUDY
In the case of the ADS-BYU bilateral aid project, BYU found itself in
a peculiar situation. It did not look at a proposal and weigh the facts and then
select the project. The project seemingly selected BYU. It was the individualsWilkinson, Clark, Bigler, President McKay, President Moyle, and others—whose
influences in the right places provided the funding which selected BYU to
administer it.

It was the individuals who became interested out of the

humanitarian appeal of the orphan refugee boys. Each of the individuals had
good intent, but their research and planning was insufficient.

It was after the

individuals became involved that the problems began to unfold and the
subsequent resolution.
Human factors such as personality conflicts, misunderstandings, and
management problems were very significant issues in BYU's involvement in the
ADS dairy project, as were communication problems and cultural conflicts.
There were also misgivings as to Alami's intents and purposes for the aid he
received.
The case study will be analyzed according to the principles stated and
discussed in chapter two to show what the project did and did not do.
1. Base the project planning on careful analysis of factual situations.
There was a great short-coming in understanding the receiver's
culture and methods of administration. The situation at the boystown was not
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studied well. The objective of building a dairy and milk processing plant was
presented by Alami and it seemed like a good humanitarian project. The factual
analysis did not seem to be very important at the time. Sufficient facts about
the receiver administration, the educational and training pursuits at the
boystown, the experience other institutions like the Ford Foundation had had at
the boystown, etc. had not been obtained.

The supporters of Alami and his

boystown were the ones providing Bigler, Wilkinson, and others with the positive
feedback but they each had a vested interest at stake and would not present
anything contrary to this interest.
The issues and problems had not been discussed openly and completely
with Wilkinson, R. H. Walker, Hugh Walker, Alami and others. Therefore, much
misunderstanding had taken place. The planning and problems were not worked
out jointly. In addition, no one from BYU actually understood the feudal landlord
thinking process and ways of Alami. This was the source of many problems. This
is why it is very important to know the people you are dealing with, their
customs, traditions, religion, etc.

These human factors have a tremendous

influence upon the thinking and business processes of the people.
Alami had very little knowledge about the dairy industry and yet
Alami wanted a fully equipped dairy plant which would be modern in every
respect.

However, he did not understand that there were not adequate funds

available to set up such a plant, nor was a big plant necessary in order to process
the small amount of milk the project would produce. R. H. Walker realized that
a very simple plant was all that was needed to pasteurize the milk for the
students' use and possibly to process ice cream.
Perhaps the project would have been more successful had they done
more research before beginning it.

All the problems can never be foreseen,
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however, some of the problems which arose between Alami and Mikkelsen could
have been avoided if R. H. Walker would have had more discussion with Bigler
and Alami. Walker himself should have gone to the project and visited with the
personnel and others who knew Alami personally. A thorough investigation into
Alami's qualifications and educational practices ought to have been carried out.
The humanitarian appeal blinded the need for a thorough feasibility study and
Alami's charm seemed to dissuade the need for a true evaluation of Alami's
administration, intents, and purposes.
The greatest handicap to the project was Alami's feudal-landlord
manner of management.

Too much power was in his hands to dictate what,

when, and how the project would be implemented and operationalized. Neither
party planned the actual implementation very well. Alami's lack of knowledge
concerning dairy cows, dairy management, and milk processing was responsible
for the improper planning of the phases and sequence of implementation. Bigler,
Wilkinson, and BYU followed Alami's lead because they did not have a full
knowledge of the situation.

The project's success was hampered by the poor

planning.
The general plan and objective of helping Alami obtain the dairy
equipment,

construct

the

necessary

edifices,

obtain

the

first

cows,

operationalize the farm, and train the refugee boys at the boystown was obvious,
but the details were not analyzed sufficiently in the beginning.
2, Select projects for action which concern recognized needs.
The dairy project began because of the interest several individuals
had in the receiving institution and its developer Alami. The Palestinian refugee
problem was still a very important issue in international polities in the 1950's and
1960's so there was a recognized need to try to provide a better way of life for
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the refugees.

The dairy project was Alami's idea of enhancing the diet of the

boys and at the same time providing dairy management training and milk
processing skills to numerous young men at the boystown.

In addition, the

original intent was to help make the boystown self-sufficient and supply other
people in the area with milk products.
However, BYU found itself in a unique situation because the Alami
project in essence selected BYU. President Wilkinson's contacts and influence
upon some of the leaders of the LDS Church opened the way for funding from the
LDS Church through its educational facility, the Brigham Young University.
These funds were used to buy several dairy animals in Holland and transport the
cattle to Jordan.
The project met Alami's desire to provide fresh milk and ice cream to
many boys. The small number of cows prevented the milking parlor from being
used more efficiently

and economically.

Likewise the processing plant

equipment was used very little because of the lack of milk volume produced and
butter fat to operate the processing equipment.
The dairy did provide sufficient milk for the boys and baby calves.
Once in awhile if there was a competent dairy technologist at the boystown
dairy, the boys would get ice cream.
Even though the dairy provided many boys with the opportunity to
learn dairy management and milk processing, there was very little need at the
time for such training in the region.
3. Orient the project to the existing technical, economic, and social level of the
receiving institution in order to make the project achievable.
The dairy project was truly oriented to the receivers but Alami was
the main receiver because the dairy was a fulfillment of his dream.

Alami
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wanted a show case modern dairy—the best in the Middle East.
concerned about the project being too extensive.

He was not

The Ford Foundation had

promised to provide the funds for the milking parlor, processing plant, and
equipment if Alami could get the dairy animals donated. Since others would be
paying for all of the project he wanted the biggest and the best whether it was
practical or not.
The social factor that the boys were not used to drinking cows' milk
and tending animals did not deter Alami and he was depending on Bigler at first
for the technical help and later this burden fell upon BYU. BYU was not aware
of the tradition that women cared for the animals. They simply assumed that
Alami knew what he was doing and that hundreds of young men would thrill at
the opportunity to learn the details of dairy management and the processing of
dairy by-products. In reality only a handful of young men took advantage of the
opportunity.
The skilled labor necessary to continue the processing operation has
always been a weak point, and the non-achievability of the dairy becoming selfsufficient became evident with the inability of the management to produce and
properly store the necessary forage requirements of the cattle. Even though the
climate and soil conditions in the Jordan Valley would allow as many as ten
cuttings of alfalfa each year, the ability to supply the necessary hay requirements was sufficient for only a small herd of cows. The harvesting methods
were archaic. The project had the capacity to supply more feed but due to the
poor management practices this was not achieved. This was one of the problems
which should have been dealt with but Alami did not want anyone doing any
studies of the farm problems. BYU was really never involved in the planning nor
in the problem solving unless the issue was a high priority to Alami such as
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obtaining the dairy equipment, the cows, and setting up the equipment. BYU was
to help set up the farm and operationalize it, to make it all properly functional,
but it was not in a position to analyze and help solve other problems.
The finances were somewhat nebulous. The Ford Foundation provided
the funds for the dairy equipment and the buildings but Alami had to find the
capital for the cows and their transportation to the farm. This was his greatest
frustration and over one and a half years elapsed before the necessary capital
was obtained to get the project started.

The funding problem became very

frustrating for all that had an interest in the project.
After all the expense to build such a modern dairy, the processing
plant and equipment was far too large and unreasonable to maintain and operate
feasibly and economically. The major reason for this was the incorrect technical
rationality.

Alami wanted the milking parlor and processing plant constructed

and ready for the cows when they arrived. However, no one seemed to point out
the fact that the size of the facilities would require many cows already in
production to utilize it.

R. H. Walker and Wilkinson did mention that the

requested facilities were too large for the ADS, but since they were not
dairymen and not really part of the planning, they were unable to change Alami's
mind.

They also failed to recognize the lapse of time needed for the small

quantity of bred heifers and calves to grow in sufficient production and herd size
to be able to utilize the facilities. In actuality the cows should have been bought
and shipped to the boystown two to three years before the large facilities were
built. By the end of two years there were only enough cows milking to warrant
only a small milking parlor. The facilities could have been built in stages. The
first should have been to acquire enough bred heifers and then wait for them to
come into production in sufficient numbers to warrant a large milking parlor.
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Once this was built, equipped, and operationalized, then an adequate processing
plant could have been studied, planned, built and equipped as the need was
ascertained. As it was, the huge processing plant was never efficiently utilized.
The only immediate need that was met was Alami's desire to build a
modern milking and processing plant. Then as the bred heifers and calves arrived
the reality of the poor technical rationale and the poor coordination and
integration of activities became apparent.
In addition to the economic and technical orientation which is needed,
the selected personnel to administer the on-site project need an orientation of
the culture, religion, and traditions to avoid as many conflicts as possible.
Because of this deficiency in planning and implementation, BYU found its
personnel involved in several conflicts. At the time BYU was involved in the
dairy project there were no qualified Middle East scholars at BYU. This lack of
qualified resource personnel was a detriment then; however, in the past twenty
years BYU has developed the Kennedy Center which has promoted curriculum
and studies in many areas including the Middle East.
Mikkelsen and Bigler did not receive much instruction concerning the
Arabs and their customs, traditions and the Islamic religion. This is evident by a
letter sent to Mikkelsen and Bigler while they were in Holland. Wilkinson was
pleased that they had been set apart as missionaries before leaving Salt Lake
City so they could have the authority to hold meetings and proselyte only as
proper by law and according to circumstances. Wilkinson made it clear that they
could not proselyte while they were working except through righteous conduct.
Even in the evening hours any proselyting would have to be done with great tact.
Wilkinson emphasized that they were guests of the country of Jordan
and it was important that they obey the laws and be courteous to the people at
all times. It is important he said, to respect the customs of the people and their
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way of life and particularly their religious beliefs and activities. The problem
was that they had not been informed as to what these laws and customs were.
Bigler's letter to President Moyle in January 1961 with a complaint
about how Mrs. Mikkelsen conducted herself in public is a case in point. Even
her desire to go swimming with the boys at the boystown is against the customs
in the Islamic countries. This lack of awareness of how to conduct herself in
Holland and especially in Islamic countries needed some attention to avoid
unnecessary problems and conflicts in the host country.

Wilkinson's comment

that this complaint was evidence showing wisdom on his part for not having put
Bigler in charge was poor judgment.

His personality conflict with Bigler was

causing Wilkinson to make brash and uncalled for comments. It was Wilkinson's
responsibility to see that the Mikkelsens and Bigler were well oriented to the
intentions and purposes of the project and how they should conduct themselves.
Religious and cultural orientations ought to have been provided to avoid
improper desires.

Wilkinson turned the responsibility of informing

the

Mikkelsens and Bigler over to R. H. Walker and he tried to explain in a letter
what they should and should not do. This lack of preparation was a detriment to
the success of the project.
The Mikkelsen's alleged incident of telling the Christian boys that
they were being mistreated by the Muslim boys could have been avoided if the
proper religious orientation had been provided.

The religious situation was

uncomfortable for Mrs. Mikkelsen and she became directly involved as she
attempted to help the Christian boys. However, when personnel are assigned to
foreign countries, one must be more careful and acknowledge the existing system
and not interfere until one has the permission or authority to do so.
Wilkinson and R. H. Walker tried in a post hoc fashion to inform the
Mikkelsens and Bigler of the need to learn and understand the customs and
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religions in the foreign land they were assigned to, but it was too late and too
little.

This was part of the source for the poor working relationship the

Mikkelsens were experiencing.

Proper bonds between Alami and Mikkelsen did

not occur and Alami had a large share in the blame. Mikkelsen tried to get along
with Alami but with the difficulties he experienced in working with Alami,
Mikkelsen probably had the feeling that he would "get along at all costs" just to
achieve his purpose of implementing the project.

The strife and contention

which arose definitely suppressed the good intentions and desires of Mikkelsen
and Smoot to teach and share ideas with Alami and among the staff and students
at the ADS.
The problems Mikkelsen had seemingly caused him to withdraw
somewhat from the other staff at the ADS.
additional handicap.

The language barrier was an

However, Mikkelsen should have mustered greater inner

strength to reach out to the other staff and gain their friendship and learn from
them. A bond of friendship with the ADS personnel could have given Mikkelsen
added help and understanding to achieve his purpose at the ADS as well as to
better understand Alami and how he could work with him. Alami placed more
importance on personal relationships, but first Mikkelsen had to prove himself by
gaining his trust and confidence.

Mikkelsen was not able to achieve this with

Alami, possibly because Alami had never liked BYU's choice to send Mikkelsen
rather than Bigler, although he verbally accepted this decision.
Mikkelsens and Bigler were sent off in a hurry to implement the
project. The old adage that "haste makes waste" came true. Wilkinson and R. H.
Walker should have made sure that the participants obtained a thorough
orientation of the culture, religion and even some language by qualified
instructors.
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After the Mikkelsens came home, the Smoots were sent over to set up
the equipment.

They were not given any orientation either.

Mrs. Smoot

experienced a cultural shock—seeing the beggars, how bread was handled without
a wrapper, etc.

She felt she was in a completely different world and was

frightened of being so far from familiar things and people. The food and the way
it was handled at the boystown repulsed her. She could hardly wait to go to
Jerusalem and find some American style groceries. The Smoots knew nothing of
the Arab monetary system and were perplexed to see Alami's home under armed
guard and the boystown protected by fences and two metal gates with sentries at
each one. The sentries looked so dark and foreign in their traditional Arab robes
with a large knife in their belt. 1 3 5
Some of the fears and problems of the Smoots and the Mikkelsens
could have been avoided had they been alerted to the living conditions they were
to be experiencing. The BYU administration should have had a planned and wellexecuted means of orienting the personnel that were to be sent to the on-site
project in the foreign land. In addition, the administrative personnel in the home
country ought to be required to attend the same orientation to understand the
problems and conditions the in-country personnel are subjected to.
The living and sanitation conditions in the foreign country should have
been explained. An orientation of buying, preparing and eating the local food
stuffs could have reduced the alarm encountered by anyone going into a
particular country.

Mrs. Smoot in particular would have been better prepared

for what she experienced. Likewise, an orientation as to the housing conditions,
costs, transportation needs, and problems is needed and will reduce the cultural
shock somewhat. The purpose for the orientation of the living conditions is to
better

prepare

the

personnel

mentally

and

emotionally for

their

new
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assignment.

This orientation can reduce the adjustment period and minimize

time loss and increase the productivity of the personnel. Settling in assistance
should be given to the families and especially to the wives.

Recreational

opportunities should be provided and if the project is of six months duration or
more, then travel opportunities out of the country ought to be provided to
enhance productivity of the personnel.
BYU did not provide an orientation on living conditions or settling in
assistance. No travel was provided other than to and from the project site. The
Mikkelsens were without transportation most of the time and had to rely on
others to take them to Jericho and Jerusalem to get groceries and other items.
The Mikkelsens and Smoots had been left totally on their own except for what
the people at the ADS offered in the way of assistance in their new environment.
4. Clearly define the objectives at all levels in terms that people will understand
and with no obvious hidden agendas.
The overall objective of helping to set up a dairy project at the
boystown was obvious but the details were missing and had to be worked out as
they were encountered.
At first Bigler was to get the cows donated in the United States but
this failed. Then he found out that it would cost too much to fly them to Jordan
if he did get them donated. Then it was suggested to buy them in Europe and
transport them by steamship, but there was still no money available for this until
the LDS Church finally donated some money. Once this problem was solved,
then the arrangements for Mikkelsens and Bigler were finalized. Mikkelsen was
informed of what his tasks would be. There was not much chance of someone
duplicating his tasks because he was the only one there who knew what needed to
be done and how to do it. However, he was not given any expressed time tables
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other than he was to be at the boystown for two years. The idea was to try and
finish the construction aspect of the project and get the dairy and processing
plant in operation as soon as possible. It was frustrating for Mikkelsen because
the workers took longer than he had expected to get things done.
There was clearly a lack of objectives stipulated which the local
personnel could understand and at the same time the custom in that area is that
the people do things according to how they are used to doing them. There is no
rush to finish things and exactness is not an important trait. The local workers
did not understand the importance of laying out a floor plan exactly as it ought
to be so the equipment will fit properly.

Alami himself was not concerned

enough to see that the workers were informed of the importance of exactness.
Problems like this should have been reasoned out among Alami, Mikkelsen and
the workers, but unfortunately they were not. The objectives were not clear nor
important enough from the workers point of view. This caused a greater rift
between Alami and Mikkelsen and hampered the efficiency of getting the
building constructed and without this phase being completed it was impossible to
begin the next phase of installing the equipment.
R. H. Walker and Wilkinson were not aware of all the problems that
Mikkelsen and later Smoot were having at the boystown. There was no plan for
evaluating the progress of the project.

Mikkelsen was not required to make

periodic reports and no one was sent from BYU to help evaluate the progress nor
help to solve the many problems which arose.

The fact that Mikkelsen was

having trouble getting the equipment set up should have motivated Wilkinson to
send someone qualified to assist in completing the project. However, the lack of
planning and funds to do so prevented him from helping to achieve this
objective. The lack of reports from Alami hindered Wilkinson's ability to truly
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understand the real reasons why Mikkelsen was not having success in achieving
this objective.
The experiences Mikkelsen had should have been reported directly to
Wilkinson and the problems should have been seriously listened to. The practical
learning experiences at the project site are very critical in determining whether
the objectives were well defined or whether the objectives need to be altered to
better fit the needs of the project and help the personnel achieve the
objectives. The BYU project could have benefited greatly by having had welldefined objectives.

When the objectives were not being met some assistance

should have been provided to help solve the problems.
The ADS boystown was seen by Bigler, Wilkinson and many others as a
great humanitarian effort.
President Wilkinson.

But a hidden agenda arose in the thinking of

Wilkinson had instigated the plan to have Bigler and

Mikkelsen set apart as missionaries in case they had the opportunity to hold
meetings or teach the gospel to those interested in knowing about the Mormon
Church. °° Wilkinson's missionary zeal was perhaps a big factor in his becoming
involved.

He had visions of many Arab young men coming to BYU for their

higher education.

He planned on at least two coming each year from the

boystown near Jericho, In addition, R. H. Walker was hoping that some of the
general authorities of the Mormon Church could look into the possibility of
expanding their emphasis into doing missionary work among the Arab people. 1 *?7
'
Mrs. Mikkelsen was accused of gathering the Christian boys around
her and suggesting that they were being abused because of their religion. Though
this may not have been a hidden agenda for her at the outset of her involvement,
it did become a factor, whether it occurred to her or not, because it had the
impact upon Alami and his staff the same as if it had been a planned hidden
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agenda.

Alami became more skeptical of the Mikkelsens and more distrusting

and irritated by them. It was just one more incident which skewed his thinking
against them. It interfered with their working relations and human relations.
The hidden agenda of missionary work was not a weighty matter but it
became a factor to the personnel at the project site. The missionary zeal was
very low key but the incidents which were seemingly harmless incidents to the
Mikkelsens and Wilkinson were perceived as another matter to Alami and his
personnel. It is better to stay far from incidents like the one Mrs. Mikkelsen was
involved in to avoid blemishing the success of the project.
Alami's hidden agenda that emerged was that he apparently was never
interested in making the dairy or the farms self-sufficient.

He used the

boystown as a humanitarian appeal to obtain funds for his farms and schools.
The farms initially were to provide the funds necessary to finance the schools
and provide all the needs for the refugee boys. This ideal was never achieved.
Alami sought after unstated political, economic, and personal benefits as
attested to by Imam's quotation that Alami exploited the project to his own
advantage and it was some time before Wilkinson even realized the effects of
Alami's hidden agenda and it certainly created a disillusionment and distrust in
Wilkinson's mind. This is a prime example of why hidden agendas should not be
pursued. Both entities of the BYU-ADS were guilty of misusing the project for
unspecified purposes and it became self-defeating and detrimental to the
project.
BYU failed to define any objectives other than helping Alami set up a
model dairy in Jericho. Because of this the personnel of both entities had many
problems in achieving the goal of setting up and operationalizing the project.
The project could have proceeded much better if Wilkinson and Alami would have
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defined the objectives even if they were solely those of Alami. At least both
parties would have understood them and Alami may have been more helpful in
achieving them.

Moreover, if there had been more understanding of the

objectives of each party perhaps the project could have been more easily
implemented.

There was a failure to delineate the objectives in a signed

contract.
The problem of the hidden agendas could have been at least partially
avoided if more knowledge and understanding of each party would have been
known and if the objectives would have been clearly defined for the project. All
issues and motives should have been discussed openly. However, it is not possible
to prevent all problems.

The intentions and purposes of all people cannot be

controlled and anticipated in the defining of objectives. In this case it appears
that Wilkinson's motives were well intended but became a big issue. The real
intent of Alami may never really be known but there is evidence that Alami did
not plan or work to make the boystown self-sufficient while Mikkelsen and Smoot
were involved in the dairy project.
5. Use open communication and democratic methods in developing the project.
The communication problems are intertwined throughout all facets of
a project. However, in the ADS-BYU dairy project the communication problems
deserve some special attention because the decision-making was not a bilateral
process nor were the facts clear to each side.
Communications problems and misunderstandings were excessive from
the outset of the project.

Bigler understood that when he was set apart as a

missionary to Jericho that he was to report directly to the First Presidency of
the LDS Church.

However, he was informed later that this meant only in

missionary matters. The dairy project was a "BYU" project and Bigler was to
report directly to Wilkinson. 138
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Wilkinson

became

frustrated

many

times

with

the

indirect

information he was receiving from Alami and the Mikkelsens. R. H. Walker, for
example, had received a letter from Bigler stating that he had received a letter
from Mikkelsen informing him that he was in a hospital with hepatitis and was
getting better.

Wilkinson wrote to Mikkelsen expressing his desire for him to

write directly to BYU on all matters in the future. Wilkinson did not like the
idea of getting the information second or third hand. Direct communications
would allow BYU to work more expeditiously if anything needed to be done. In
addition, direct correspondence was always more satisfying and much less likely
to be distorted. 1 3 9
Mikkelsen was on his own in Jericho with no support system;
therefore, he would write to Bigler for help and understanding. The working
relationship was poor between Mikkelsen and Alami. Alami wanted all things
done in his way and when and if he wanted them done. There were never any
clear and open channels of communication. Neither problems nor achievements
were discussed regularly with all personnel and administrators. The project was
Alami's and he had to have total control. Alami did not confide in Wilkinson nor
did he communicate to Wilkinson the problems he had expressed to others that he
was having with the Mikkelsens. Alami did not act tactfully and directly when
the problems arose.

There was relatively no dialogue which could have

facilitated more feedback and unity of purpose. Mikkelsen did not communicate
his problems with Alami to Wilkinson.
The flow of ideas, problems, and feelings did not occur. Therefore,
Wilkinson never obtained a clear picture of problems and events at the ADS.
Wilkinson had no way of appropriately reconciling the problems.
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Mikkelsen and Smoot were both hampered by the poor and indirect
communication which definitely handicapped BYU's ability to properly plan and
execute the implementation of a sound project.
Wilkinson in turn was not getting a clear picture of the problems
Mikkelsen and Smoot were having with Alami.

During his evaluation of

Wilkinson's file on the ADS, Cleon Skousen had talked with Smoot and Mikkelsen
and had discussed the difficulty they each had had with Alami. He felt that
these two men had a better understanding of the operation of the project than
anyone else in the Utah area because of the combined two and a half years they
had worked at the ADS.

However, since Bigler was always enthusiastic and

accentuating the positive and playing down the negative, Smoot and Mikkelsen
were hesitant to say anything negative.

Everyone had been hoping that the

project would become a shining success. Skousen even admitted that he had been
reluctant to say anything derrogative about the project.
In reality Wilkinson was receiving propaganda reports from the Alami
Foundation in New York and the personnel who were sent over by BYU did not
want to jeopardize the project with any negative feedback. In Smoot's written
report to Wilkinson some time after the report discrepancies were showing up,
Smoot stated that he was asked to report on his achievements at the ADS and
was not given the time or even asked about the problems he had. So he did not
bother to report problems, especially since Bigler and Wilkinson were so
optimistic and high on the ADS-BYU dairy project.
Mikkelsen never did feel a part of Alami's staff.

His working

relationship with Alami was hampered by the poor channels of communication.
He was not prepared properly for his in-country assignment and when he was
considered out-of-line, Alami did not confront him directly to discuss the matter
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judiciously and tactfully. Alami should have reported all incidents to Wilkinson
directly and promptly but he failed to do this. In Mikkelsen's case, Alami did not
want the equipment set up so there was no deadline or rush to accomplish this
task.
The decision-making process at the boystown was never a democratic
system. It was Alami's project and the tradition of the wealthy, like Alami, was
to use feudal landlord tactics.

If Alami did not agree with implementing a

particular innovation, it was not implemented.

This incompatibility between

Alami and Mikkelsen was eventually the cause for having Mikkelsen return home
early.

BYU as the sender organization never knew all the problems which

Mikkelsen was facing with Alami and Mikkelsen never knew of all the complaints
Alami had expressed against him nor the real reason of why he was asked to
return to BYU early.
The decisions Alami made were not always in line with his financial
capabilities. Alami was often asking for more donations. His decisions were not
always in line with the overall objective of the project. The project was to be
self-sufficient and self-supporting but at times he would have crops ploughed
down which could have been harvested or given to the refugees or poor people in
the area. Then he would immediately make pleas for additional donations. He
would sell calves which he should have kept to build up a larger herd, and then he
would ask for more donations of animals.
The proper use of communication channels could have enhanced the
democratic decision-making, but Alami would have no part of it. The project
was going to be administered his way.

He was completely involved in it but

there was not going to be much change on his part unless he wanted and asked
for the change. There was a basic relationship problem from the beginning but
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little could have been done to change Alami. Even those who knew him best
could not work with him. If they had ideas of their own and a desire to change
things, Alami would oppose them and prevent any changes. This was Amer Salti's
experience and he even grew up under Alami's system and had returned for a
time to manage the farm. Salti was not able to develop the democratic decisionmaking process which he desired. Even his communication channels were poor so
he had to leave the project to save their friendship.
6. Keep the project flexible to meet long-term situations and short-term
changes and special emergencies.
Wilkinson and R. H. Walker were wise to have someone go to the
project who could stay for two years or more if needed to give the project
continuity.

However, since Alami and Bigler had become good friends, this

presented some conflicts and biased Alami's view of Mikkelsen. The decision by
BYU to allow Bigler to go along with the Mikkelsens was an example of
flexibility, and ultimately the decision to have Mikkelsen return six months early
was an example of an unexpected change. Even though it violated the theory of
continuity, the fact that Wilkinson and Alami had agreed to send Mikkelsen home
shows the ability to make changes when one party was not satisfied with the
situation.

Wilkinson eventually reacted to the situation where Mikkelsen had

been involved in a situation he did not fully belong. In reality, however, Alami's
attitude toward Mikkelsen was poor and his removal was in the best interest of
the project. There was not a strong need for him to remain since Alami wanted
someone else to install the equipment. Alami had achieved his immediate desire
to build the cow sheds and milking parlor and processing plant as well as
receiving a few bred heifers to start the dairy operation. Moreover, there was
little need for the year and a half Mikkelsen was there to set up the equipment.
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Alami prevented Mikkelsen from setting up the equipment and blamed his socalled inability to get it done. The timing for its installation was not critical at
all and this left plenty of time and flexibility to find someone else to eventually
replace Mikkelsen and set up the equipment. The lack of funds to send someone
to help Mikkelsen install the equipment was a serious problem in flexibility. It
was a weakness which hampered the completion of the project.

Even though

time was not a critical factor in getting the equipment set up, the inability to
help Mikkelsen get it done hampered the project because of the bad reports being
spread about Mikkelsen's inability to set it up.

The other problems probably

became accentuated because of Alami's dissatisfaction with Mikkelsen on this
issue. Alami's needs were not being met as he had anticipated they would be and
this caused conflict among them.
If more funds had been available there would have been more
flexibility to the project as to having Bigler participate in the project of buying
and shipping the cows and staying longer at the project. A more qualified man
could have gone to help Mikkelsen set up the equipment and to help in many
other ways. The financial straits caused many of the problems encountered in
helping to implement the project and in achieving the objectives much sooner
than they were.

Maybe then Alami would have been more pleased with

Mikkelsen's efforts and desires to help make the project successful.
7.

Make the project

educational and direct it toward bringing about

improvement in the ability of the people to solve their own problems.
One of the primary intents of the dairy project was an educational
tool to train many young men in the skills of dairy management and milk
processing. One of the limiting factors of the young men's interest was the fact
that they were not accustomed to cows' milk and it was not traditionally the
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men's or the boys' place to care for the animals. It was the tradition for the
women and girls to take care of the animals. However, there were a few boys
who had an interest and were trained in the project. Some of these young men
graduated and found jobs with dairymen in various areas in that region of the
world. For these young men it was a positive educational experience. They were
the recipients of a new technology and skills which had not been available to
them prior to the BYU-ADS dairy project.
The project was educational for the donors also and especially for the
Mikkelsens and Smoots who learned a great deal about the recipients and how to
work with them and teach them. The project did provide the opportunity for
some young men who took advantage of it to better their lives by learning and
applying this new knowledge, skills and technology. Mikkelsen was aware of his
purpose of training those interested and he related that both he and the young
men were gratified by the achievements they were able to attain. The quality
and depth of training was never stipulated so the extent to which the young men
were able to better solve their own problems from the training they received is
unknown.
There was a need to establish more long-range training programs to
ensure the availability of qualified personnel to operate all aspects of the dairy
project.

This could have helped in making the dairy project a viable economic

unit.
8.

The project should be carried out by well-trained personnel, effectively

supervised.
BYU selected Mikkelsen because they thought he was qualified from a
technical point of view, but the new environment, his incompatibility with
Alami, and the working conditions created some problems.

Alami was not
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qualified to supervise Mikkelsen and evidently Mikkelsen had some concerns
himself about being able to set up the equipment alone. BYU did not sufficiently
investigate this potential problem.

Bigler made things worse by trying to

promote his own aspirations and by telling Alami that Mikkelsen had told him
that he was not sure he could set up the equipment.
BYU did, however, succeed in sending personnel who were committed
to doing everything possible to ensure the success of the project.

The basic

nature of Mikkelsen and Smoot was to succeed at whatever they undertook. An
administration needs to select men of this calibre. This character trait greatly
enhanced the implementation and relative success of the dairy project.
BYU should have sent a man with more practical experience in setting
up the dairy equipment. Mikkelsen had problems relating to and communicating
with the personnel on the dairy project and one reason was because of the
language barrier. Alami accused him of isolating himself from the others. The
ideal situation would have been to find a dairy technologist fluent in Arabic.
However, even if the personnel just tried to learn some words and mingle with
the other personnel a good friendship can develop and the isolation will not
become such a problem. In Mikkelsen's letters, it was apparent that he was very
patient and his advocate, Tom Dammann, stated that he was working under very
difficult circumstances. Smoot also complemented Mikkelsen on the fine work
he was able to accomplish and some of the people spoke well of him at the
boystown.
Mikkelsen seemed to be reasonably compatible with others but not so
much with Alami. This was a detriment to the project as was the fact that he
was not able to set up the equipment.

Mikkelsen and Smoot were strongly

committed in trying to do all they were capable of in making the project a
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success. One drawback was that they were alone and had no one to bolster them
and help them in the times of need.
Smoot was very committed to getting the equipment set up and
operationalized.

He had the technical ability and determination plus the

circumstance that Alami was gone a great deal of the time that Smoot was
setting up the equipment. Otherwise he admitted that it would have taken much
longer to achieve his objectives.
9. Good project planning provides for evaluation of the results.
The objectives were not clearly or carefully defined and this makes it
hard to evaluate a project.
Mikkelsen and Alami should have written formal reports of the
problems and achievements, and Wilkinson should have demanded reports. In this
manner Mikkelsen's experiences and problems could have been better understood
and pondered by Wilkinson and R. H. Walker. Perhaps they could have realized
the need to implement a better support and communication system.
Wilkinson and R. H. Walker should have contacted other individuals
who were knowledgeable of the ADS and Alami but not having a vested interest
in the ADS. By so doing they would have gained additional information which
would have alerted them to Alami's explosive disposition at times, his feudal
lordship attitude, and other facts which could have minimized the problems
which occurred. Wilkinson and R. H. Walker were not fully aware of the native
ways of thinking and doing things and much less that of Alami and his intents and
purposes for the ADS.
Alami's objectives were not fully understood by those at BYU;
therefore, it was impossible to evaluate the results.

BYU was not directly

involved in the planning of the project. They were basically involved in only
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helping Alami achieve his own goal of building a dairy project. BYU indirectly
planned to help get the cattle and the dairy technologist to aid in this
humanitarian cause.

Because of this ad hoc relationship BYU had very little

control over the actual implementation schedule and its periodic evaluation. The
lack of reporting to BYU and the lack of supervision other than Mikkelsen's onsite self-super vision was a deficiency on BYU's part. Wilkinson should have had
more follow-up on Mikkelsen by someone going to Jericho to evaluate the
progress and see and experience first hand the difficulties Mikkelsen was
having.

On a couple of occasions Wilkinson did have someone look in on

Mikkelsen but this was only superficial. To know the problems someone should
have gone there and stayed for some time. People are always on good behavior
when strangers come for only a short period of time.
BYU should have taken a more active part in planning and evaluating
the project once it became officially involved. This should have been another
one of the stipulations when the money was donated.

This deficiency led to

many difficulties encountered by Mikkelsen and Smoot and allowed Alami, a man
with no dairy experience, to control the planning and implementation of a million
dollar dairy facility. The result was a show place which has never been fully and
consistently operationalized.

There were not any objectives defined for the

quality and depth of training to be done with the assistants to Mikkelsen and
Smoot as well as to the young men. These objectives should have been stipulated
and followed up on. The short-term involvement resulted in inadequate training
and supervision of personnel to manage and operate the dairy and the milk
processing equipment.
The project could have been more successful if there had been
provisions made to monitor and evaluate all aspects of the dairy project. This
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principle essentially was not planned for at all.

There was no proper

measurement criteria nor any methods of information collection. Wilkinson did
not even ask for any evaluation except for the personal reports of Mikkelsen and
Smoot upon their return. He only asked for the achievements and left little if
any room for discussion of the problems.

It was years later when Wilkinson

began to receive negative feedback which prompted him to investigate more
about the contradictions he was receiving. His collection of information on the
project was biased because a large portion came from reports sent out by the
Alami Foundation which sought friends and sympathy to help support the
humanitarian project.
Conclusion
BYU did not obtain enough factual information about Alami and the
dairy he planned.

BYU undertook the project rather blindly. The recognized

need was to supply the refugee orphan boys with dairy products to improve their
diet and to provide training in dairy management. The problem was that it was
"Alami's Dairy" and it was primarily developed to meet Alami's dream and
secondarily it met the objective of supplying dairy products and training for the
boys. The orientation of the project was to the receivers but Alami became the
main receiver.

The project was too grandiose and did not fit the technical,

economic, or social level of the receivers in general. The achievability of the
project was greatly hampered by Alami's poor management ability, his incorrect
technical rationality, and his feudal landlord tactics.

The lack of financial

planning also made it more difficult to achieve the objectives. Moreover, the
lack of orientation of the culture, religion, and traditions added to the conflicts
and lack of productivity at the project site.
achievability and success of the project.

The deficiency decreased the
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Alami's objectives were not fully known by BYU; therefore, they were
not clearly defined. This was a great weakness in the project and the problems
which arose from the hidden agendas by both parties strained the relationship of
the BYU-ADS project.

In addition, the communication problems were a big

detriment to the project. The lack of direct communication and proper reporting
of problems made it difficult for Wilkinson to ascertain how to help the on-site
BYU personnel.

Alami's feudal landlord tactics made a democratic decision-

making process non-existent. Alami wanted and had full control.
The project was somewhat flexible to short-term and emergency
changes. This was possible because of BYU's real lack of management involvement in the project. What Alami wanted, he eventually received and BYU was
able to adapt and let him have his way. The real inflexibility arose from the lack
of funds available for Wilkinson to send someone over to help Mikkelsen set-up
the equipment and to help supervise the project.
The project was definitely educational for all involved but the ability
of the project to improve the receivers' problem solving skills is not really ascertainable.

Only a few boys took advantage of the training and improved their

livelihood substantially but the ability of the managers to continue the dairy and
processing operations was questionable. They were not capable of keeping the
milk production and quality up nor in operating the processing equipment without
the aid of an outside dairy technologist. Even with the well trained technologists
which BYU had sent to the project, the project was not successful in creating a
situation where the receiver personnel could carry on without outside help in
some areas of management. Possibly a longer-term was needed to overcome this
weakness. The project had relatively well-trained personnel from the donors but
the BYU supervision was insufficient to help Mikkelsen in times of need. There
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had been a need to send additional help to eventually install the processing
equipment. This could have been achieved much earlier than it was and it might
have reduced the personality conflicts and issues which arose from them.
The project really lacked proper planning and as a result there were
no clearly defined objectives, no contractual agreement, and no means for
gathering data nor in properly monitoring the on-site project.

These

shortcomings prevented any opportunity for BYU to share in the control and
evaluation of the dairy project.
The failure of the BYU-ADS dairy project to follow such principles as
those outlined in chapter two presents evidence showing the necessity of
following the principles stated in this thesis. If these principles would have been
set forth and followed they would have enhanced the understanding of the
motives for building such a dairy project. These principles would have enhanced
the clarity of the project, they would have solved many of the personality
conflicts and misunderstanding from the beginning to the end, they would have
enhanced the implementation of a good project and they would have facilitated
the resource flow.

These principles cannot always be followed completely in

various socio-cultural contexts but by attempting to follow such guidelines the
probability for success can be increased.
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A
List of Main Characters
Alami, Musa Bey (1897-1984). Born in Jerusalem and was the president of the
Arab Development Society (ADS) and the developer of the boys' refugee
ranch at Jericho, Jordan. He received his law degree from Cambridge
University in England and was very active in politics in Palestine. He was
the highest ranking Arab in the British Mandate Government. Alami gave
up his political career to devote his life to helping the peasants improve
their lot in life. However, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War changed his emphasis
and that of the ADS to finding a solution for resettling the thousands of
Palestinian Arab refugees.
Ashton, Ralph. Poultry producer in the Salt Lake area. Bigler selected him to
go to Jericho as the poultry specialist for the ADS.
Bigler, Louis Bertrand (1899-1984). Born in Fountain Green, Utah and became a
successful businessman. He also developed a Jersey dairy farm in West
Jordan, Utah. Alami had visited Utah and Bigler at his dairy. Bigler became very interested in helping Alami and was instrumental in finding and
purchasing the necessary milking parlor and milk processing plant equipment. Bigler was also involved in trying to obtain cattle donations to send
to Jericho. He later went to Holland where he and Mikkelsen bought the
cattle and continued on to the ADS farm at Jericho for two months.
Burns, Norman. Worked for the American Embassy in Jordan. He was involved
with the "Point Four" program which granted the ADS project $75,000 per
year to care for an additional one hundred refugee boys at the ADS boys
farm. He is also related to Bigler, his mother being a Bigler.
Burton, Theodore M. General Authority in the LDS Church. He set Bigler and
Mikkelsen apart as missionaries before they left Salt Lake City for Jericho.
Clark, Dale. Worked for the "Point Four" program in Washington, D.C. and had
been to the Middle East checking on the aid programs. He became interested in the Alami project as early as 1951. At the time of his involvement in
Utah he was working for the Davis County Bank in Farmington, Utah.
Clark was in charge of the funds allocated to purchase the dairy equipment.
He was in favor of having President Wilkinson and BYU become involved in
the project.
Dajani, Shahadeh. Managed the ADS farm in the 1960's. He is an agronomist by
profession.
Dammann, Tom. News columnist for the Chicago Tribune, was at Aqaba and
Jericho when the beef cattle were unloaded. He had an unpleasant response from Alami.
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Dekker, Peter. Was in charge of a clearing house firm in the Netherlands which
was instrumental in helping the representatives from BYU find the desired
cattle, and had them prepared and shipped.
Drake, Gordon Eugene. Selected by Bigler to go to Jericho as the horticulture
expert for the ADS farm.
Ellsworth, Leo.
Manager of the Deseret Farms of Florida Incorporated.
Sanctioned selection and shipment of Santa Gertrudis beef cattle to
Jericho.
Fryer, Era Reeseman (Cy). Administrator in the International Voluntary
Services. Was directly interested and involved with the Alami project.
Furlonge, Sir Geoffrey. Author of Palestine, My Country, the biography of Musa
El Alami.
Hallam, Dr. Dean of the College of Biological and Agricultural Science at
Brigham Young University. Worked closely with Ernest L. Wilkinson in
trying to find qualified personnel to go to Jericho to aid the ADS.
Ham am eh, Reem. The daughter of a special friend of Alami and secretary to
Alami in Jerusalem. She played an active role in teaching women crafts in
the frontier villages and helped in the administration of the boys farm.
Hawkins, David H. Assistant manager of the Deseret Farms of Florida Inc. He
personally selected the beef cows and bulls sent to the ADS in Jericho.
Hogan, Glen. Was a West Jordan, Utah dairyman who was well qualified in
dairying and milk processing and the installation of such equipment. He
had been asked to go to Jericho by Bigler to set up the dairy equipment.
His health was poor and never made it to Jericho.
Hopkins, Reverend Garland. Was affiliated with the Alami Foundation in New
York and Secretary General of the World Fellowship of Muslims and
Christians Inc.
Imam, Fareed. A friend of King Hussein who handled most of the official tours
of Jordan for the King.
Johariah, George. Managed the ADS farm in early 1960's.
Kolleck, Teddy. Mayor of Jerusalem and long-time friend of Alami and advocate
of his boystown and farms at Jericho.
Love, Kennett. Member of the Alami Foundation Advisory Board in New York
and journalist by profession.
McCowen, Dr. Monroe. Was in charge of the Food and Agriculture program in
the Near East for the International Cooperative Association (ICA).
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McKay, David O. President of the LDS Church. Was the first LDS President
with whom Alami became acquainted. President McKay was respected by
Alami and McKay praised the great work Alami was engaged in. It was
McKay who gave the ultimate approval for the funds which were used to
purchase and ship the dairy cattle to Jericho.
Mendenhall, Wendell. Chairman of the Building Committee of the LDS Church.
This committee eventually stipulated the conditions under which the
$17,500 was granted to BYU for the purchase and shipment of the dairy
cows from Holland to Jericho.
Mikkelsen, Seymour. Was a professor in the Animal Science Department at BYU
who had been selected to be the BYU representative in purchasing and
shipping of the cattle and the operationalization of the dairy project in
Jericho. He was to spend two years getting the dairy into operation and
training the young men in every area of the dairy business.
Morris, Authur J. Professor and dairy science expert at Utah State University.
Bigler approached him for advice in selecting and purchasing the dairy
equipment for the ADS.
Moyle, Henry D. Counselor to President McKay of the LDS Church. He was
favorable to the BYU-ADS dairy project and instrumental in getting beef
cattle from the LDS Florida ranch donated to the ADS.
Parr, Dr. W. O. President of the World Friendship Organization. Shipped the
beef cattle donated from the Florida ranch as well as some dairy equipment.
Peterson, Dean A. Administrative Assistant to Ernest L. Winkinson. Requested
by ELW to review the ADS literature in ELW's possession and then report
on his findings.
Richards, Grant. Dairy specialist at BYU.
Rynn, Donald. Was in the international transport business and a friend of Alami
who eventually took over the responsibility of getting the dairy equipment
to New York and preparing it for shipment to Jericho. He took care of all
the paper work, clearance through customs, insurance, etc.
Salah, Daoud. Nicknamed "The Prince". Managed the ADS farm in the late
1960's and was on the farm during the 1967 war as a member of the staff.
Salti, Amer Omer. One of the Orphan boys taken in at the ADS by Alami, was
the first to come to BYU to further his education. Later he managed the
ADS farm in 1973.
Skousen, Cleon. Was a professor at BYU and a tour director to the Holy Land.
Had toured the ADS on different occasions.
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Smoot, Neldon and Lola. Neldon was a Jersey dairyman in Centerville, Utah. He
was hired to go to Jericho to set up the dairy parlor and processing plant
equipment after Mikkelsen had left the boys farm. He spent approximately
a year setting up the equipment and operational zing the processing plant.
He also trained some of the boys to care for the cows, do the milking, and
process the milk.
Tarazi, Wahib. Government Veterinarian at Jericho. He spent much of his own
time trying to upgrade the ADS dairy herd and its production during the
post 1967 war period.
Walker, Hugh. Was the Ford Foundation representative in Beirut, Lebanon. He
was very instrumental in obtaining large grants for the Alami project. He
helped Alami obtain necessary personnel to help in various areas to administer and teach at the ADS.
Walker, Rudger H. Had spent two years in Iran on the "Point Four" program
administered by the Utah State University and upon his return became the
Dean of Biological and Agricultural Science at BYU. President Wilkinson
had put him in charge of the BYU project of aiding the ADS dairy project.
Wilkinson, Ernest L. Was the President of Brigham Young University. He took a
great interest in Alami's dairy project and the refugee boys' school at
Jericho in general. Wilkinson spearheaded the coordination of the approval
of the funds from the LDS Church to purchase the cattle in Holland. He
coordinated the attempts to obtain qualified personnel that Alami had
requested to run the horticultural and poultry projects that had already
been on going.
Wilson, M. L. He played a significant role in obtaining support for the Alami
projects. He visited Wilkinson at BYU with the hope of getting Wilkinson
involved in the Alami dairy project.

